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In the present thesis I analyse the roles of individual ability and structural em-
beddedness on entrepreneurial success. The results retrieved from a matched 
employer-employee longitudinal data set show prior worker productivities and 
environmental embeddedness to have a persistent positive impact on the size 
and growth rates of new firms. What is more, embeddedness facilitates the im-
pact of ability on start-up performance with outsiders of comparable abilities 
starting smaller and slower growing firms. Those in higher ability categories 
are more likely to transfer and also, albeit to a lesser extent, close their ven-
tures, an effect attributed to the higher opportunity costs associated with the 
group.  Firms managed by embedded agents enjoy longer longevities and have 
better chances of finding a new owner after the departure of the previous one. 








“For he is Odysseus, a man of great craft, son of Laertes born in rugged Ithaca, and ex-
cels in all manner of tactics and subtle mētis”  





Mētis is an Ancient Greek word that denotes a quality of skill or cunning. It was the de-
fining trait of Odysseus, a character introduced by Homer in the Iliad and the hero of the 
later Odyssey. Odysseus is a man of cunning who will take all necessary measures to 
guarantee the success of his endeavours. By deceiving the Trojan with the gift of a giant 
wooden horse, Odysseus was able to sneak into the citadel and overcome a larger force 
than his own. Odysseus used whatever scarce resources he had at his disposal to great 
effect, often by spotting an opportunity where others saw but a deadlock. Whilst the con-
temporary reader may be estranged by such a take on heroism, the conception of mētis 
was in fact deeply rooted in Classic Greek tradition. Alexander the Great, for example, is 
credited with solving the Gordian knot riddle by simply cutting it with his sword. Greek 
heroes were not necessarily the bravest or the wisest. What they achieved however, was 
unique and that was what distinguished them from their peers. 
The previous analogy offers a brief description of one of the traits most common-
ly associated with the figure of the entrepreneur. The notion that entrepreneurs play 
unique role in an economy can be traced back to Cantillon (1755) and has over time re-
ceived attention from scholars in various fields. Whilst contributions inspired mainly by a 
disequilibrium approach to entrepreneurship emphasised the importance of the ability to 
discover and create business opportunities (Schumpeter, 1934; Schultz, 1975; Casson, 
1982; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Sarasvathy, 2001), other studies focused on how 
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differences in ability affected occupational choices leading to entrepreneurship and the 
resulting individual and firm outcomes (Lucas, 1978; Casson, 1982; Amit et al., 1995; 
Hamilton, 2000)
1
. Holmes and Schmitz (1990) showed that individuals with greater lev-
els of ability to identify opportunities had a comparative advantage in specialising in seri-
al entrepreneurship whilst Gimeno et al. (1997) explained the subsistence of underper-
forming firms with the relatively lack of employment alternatives for their owners.  
However, the effect of ability on firm outcomes can also be conditioned by the ex-
isting degree of embeddedness between the entrepreneur and the business environment. 
Firm internationalisation literature has long identified a liability of foreignness effect 
(Zaheer, 1995) that hampers the performance of otherwise competitive newcomers into a 
market. More recent contributions (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) have generalised this 
finding to all outsiders to a given environment and Figueiredo et al. (2002) found a strong 
preference for entrepreneurs to start a new firm in areas where they had previously 
worked. 
In this thesis I assess how ability and embeddedness affect the outcomes of new 
ventures and of their founders. Using a longitudinal data set with detailed information of 
both individual and firm characteristics, I explore how past productivities of individuals 
as wage-earners impact upon entrepreneurial outcomes and decisions. The distances be-
tween geographic locations of the workplaces of those individuals before and after the 
beginning of their first self-employment spell serve as a proxy for embeddedness and also 
constitute a determinant of firm performance, longevity, and transfer. 
Results confirm the presence of a lasting interconnection between past productivi-
ties and the performance of subsequently created firms, with ventures created by superior 
                                                 
1 Whilst acknowledging the literature based on the risk preferences of the entrepreneur developed from the early in-
sights of Knight (1929) and the contributions of Khilstrom and Laffont (1979), I will be centring the present discussion 
on the question of entrepreneurial ability. 
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ability entrepreneurs being larger and experiencing stronger rates of growth. Firms started 
by embedded, local actors perform better than those started by outsiders, although the 
very best amongst outsiders outperform all other groups. Better ability improves the 
chances of firm transferring to another businessperson whilst increasing, albeit to a lesser 
extent, the probability of closure. A substantial share of those exiting a venture by trans-
fer will later re-enter entrepreneurship with the starting of a new business. This contrasts 
with the trend of those who exited a venture via closure, as the latter group is more likely 
to return to paid-employment. Those with highest levels of ability are the most likely to 
re-enter by start-up. 
The present thesis is organised as follows. The Survey chapter offers an overview 
of the literatures on entrepreneurial ability and structural embeddedness that are subse-
quently developed into a set of testable propositions in the Hypotheses chapter. The Data 
and Methods section details the characteristics of the sources employed, an exploratory 
analysis focused on the variables of interest, and the exposition of the chosen methodolo-
gies. Model results and discussion are presented and discussed on chapter VI. The work 




III. Survey of the Literature 
 
A. Entrepreneurial Ability 
The Role of the Entrepreneur.—There is a common sense in which chief executive offic-
ers of large corporations exercise a good deal of economic power. This coordinative 
power, or ability, derives from the influence their decisions exert on the productivity of 
large numbers of others in the organisation as a whole (Rosen, 1982). For the purposes 
the present thesis the set of skills used by the entrepreneur to influence firm outcomes 
will be denoted as entrepreneurial ability. In some specific occasions other terms—such 
as managerial talent, individual ability, economic power or capabilities—will be used 
interchangeably with entrepreneurial ability. This is done in order to accommodate for the 
different language employed in the literature. 
 In no other business context are the repercussions of the actions of one individual 
as evident as in the entrepreneurial venture. Compared to established organisations, a new 
firm gives the entrepreneur a much greater degree of autonomy, offering a blank slate for 
the shaping of new competences and routines. Baumol saw the entrepreneur as ―the apex 
of the hierarchy that determines the behaviour of the firm‖ (Baumol, 1968: p.64). The 
image is revealing of the impact attributed to the actions of a single person on a firm and 
facilitates the introduction of the abstraction of entrepreneurial ability. Entrepreneurial 
ventures provide researchers with a tabula rasa for the study of how managerial actions 
shape and affect the fate or organisations. Initial conditions—including those which can 
be directly attributable to the entrepreneur—produce long-lasting effects on the perfor-
mance and longevity of new firms (Geroski et al., 2010) by imprinting routines and estab-
lishing path-dependencies (Baron et al. 1999).  
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 A second domain in which the influence of the entrepreneur is evident is the mar-
ket in itself. Entrepreneurial activity plays a pivoting role in the supply side of a market 
by identifying opportunities and fulfilling them (Schultz, 1975). The function of the en-
trepreneur—as Cantillon noted over 250 years ago— is to anticipate the combination of 
productive resources that will generate goods and services that are sought after in the 
market place. This ability differentiates entrepreneurs from the remainder of the work-
force in both actions and cognitions (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Sarasvathy (2001) at-
tributes the differing character of the entrepreneur to the way these individuals or act up-
on, or effectuate, business opportunities. Effectuation—in contrast to causation, which 
selects the necessary means to achieve an effect—refers to the utilisation of presently 
available resources for the exploitation of emerging contingencies. The uniqueness and 
the role of the entrepreneur then reside on the ability to seize contingent opportunities and 
exploit ―any and all means at hand to fulfil a plurality of current and future aspirations‖ 
(Sarasvathy, 2001: p.262). 
 The preceding paragraph presented the effectuation of opportunities to create 
businesses as a defining function of the entrepreneur. These opportunities can be seen as 
stemming internally or externally to the entrepreneur. In the case of the former, opportu-
nities are crafted by an entrepreneur who starts a business by destabilising an pre-existing 
market equilibrium in a process of creative destruction à la Schumpeter. For the latter, the 
entrepreneur possesses a higher degree of environmental alertness that allows for the 
recognition and exploitation of opportunities that are repeatedly and exogenously emerge 
(Kirzner, 1979; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In any event, the entrepreneur is per-
ceived as a dynamic actor in the environment and his creative role as resource co-
ordinator recognised as distinct from that of the manager of an established firm. 
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Disequilibria and Opportunities.—In an early contribution to the study of entrepreneur-
ship Baumol (1968) noticed the apparent paradox resulting from the absence of the entre-
preneur in the mainstream expectational equilibrium approach to economic theory. The 
theoretical firm was therefore entrepreneur-less—an omission which, as the author com-
mented, could only be compared to a play of Hamlet where the role for the Prince of 
Denmark was unfulfilled. Theatrical considerations aside, Baumol proceeded by asserting 
the importance of entrepreneurial ability in dealing with economic phenomena. Schultz 
(1975) further supplemented Baumol‘s critique by examining the notion of continual dis-
equilibria as the primordial apparatus of economic development. Disequilibria created by 
exogenous shocks lead to the appearance of new business opportunities. Technological 
progress, demographic shifts and variations in consumer preferences exemplified the type 
of disequilibria and therefore opportunities that continuously and autonomously emerge 
(Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). 
  Entrepreneurship is the process by which ―opportunities to bring into existence 
‗future‘ goods and services are discovered, created, and exploited‖ (Venkataraman 1997, 
p. 120). In a world where new business opportunities are constantly spawning, entrepre-
neurs become the agents who deal with, and mitigate, disequilibria by correctly anticipat-
ing market demand.  The ability to do so is a scarce resource heterogeneously distributed 
in the population and which could be aggregated into a ―supply curve of entrepreneurial 
capacity‖ (Becker, 1971: pp.122-123). The information necessary to recognise a potential 
opportunity is not widely available to all agents because of the specialisation of infor-
mation in society (Hayek, 1945). Ability then consists of a set of skills which enable the 
identification and exploitation of rising business opportunities and hence is a valuable 
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resource for individuals working in self- but also in paid-employment (Casson, 1982; 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
 Ability may be innate to a person but also expanded over time by investing in 
education and in the development of work experience. As a consequence of the benefits 
originating from the division of labour, individuals will have an incentive to specialise in 
different tasks and trade with each other (Rosen, 1983). The specialisation into different 
occupations gave rise to the heterogeneity in the ability to perform different tasks, includ-
ing those associated with entrepreneurship. In his classic model of occupational choice, 
Lucas (1978) asserted that individuals differed in terms of ability and were able to seam-
lessly transition from workers to entrepreneurs. Implicit to Lucas‘ argument was the as-
sumption that worker and entrepreneurial abilities were identical. Under various simplify-
ing assumptions, he showed that as economies accumulated capital, the least able indi-
viduals were likely to revert from entrepreneurship to paid employment. That is, over 
time average firm size expanded with small-scale entrepreneurs increasingly replaced by 
larger organisations. As bigger firms needed more workers, demand for labour was bound 
to surge, making paid-employment an increasingly enticing option for current entrepre-
neurs. Smaller firms were then more likely to exit the market, not because of their lack of 
quality but rather by the increasingly greater opportunity cost put before the entrepreneur 
of these firms. The distinction between voluntary exits motivated by the increase in the 
demand for labour of the larger organisations and the exit associated with the failure of a 
business model has been the subject of subsequent research in entrepreneurship by Headd 
(2003), Bates (2005), and Balcaen et al. (2012).  
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Opportunity Costs.—As previously discussed, opportunity costs serve as a major driver in 
occupational choice, affecting not only the longevity, but also the ownership and man-
agement, of entrepreneurial ventures (Lucas, 1978; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990).  Depend-
ing on the threshold of performance, entrepreneurs decide on maintaining or discontinu-
ing of a business. This implies, as suggested by Gimeno et al. (1997), that firm survival is 
not strictly a function of economic performance, but rather of performance relative to a 
firm-specific threshold. Comparable firms with similar economic performance may hence 
experience opposite fates, as entrepreneurs with distinct levels of ability will differ in the 
compensations required to maintain the firm. 
 Holmes and Schmitz further explored the issue of opportunity cost by focusing on 
the circumstances in which firms were transferred between businesspeople of different 
levels of entrepreneurial ability. Drawing from a Schultzian model of an economy in con-
stant disequilibrium, the authors investigated the circumstances under which entrepre-
neurs decide either to continue operating a venture, or to transfer it to a possibly less able 
entrepreneur in order to release time and resources to explore new opportunities. They 
showed that the least able types who remain in self-employment will only manage exist-
ing firms, whilst the most able individuals will instead specialise in setting-up new busi-
nesses. Individuals with intermediate ability optimally either manage the businesses they 
started, or replace them with higher quality businesses purchased from the higher ability 
entrepreneurs. 
 One important novelty of the Holmes and Schmitz model is the understanding of 
how opportunity cost affects the individual decision of the entrepreneur prior to determin-
ing the fate of the firm. By distinguishing between the exit of the entrepreneur and the 
closure of the business the authors recognised that these firms may be retain a degree of 
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economic value that generated demand by other individuals. In fact, individuals may spe-
cialise in the initial stages of venture creation and development with the specific intent of 
later on cashing-out on the founded business (Arora and Nandkumar, 2011). By contrast, 
some of the firms that remain in operation may even exhibit performance levels below 
those of the discontinuing ventures. The reason for such entrepreneurs to be stuck in a 
self-employment limbo is again attributable to the lack of matching outside alternatives. 
 
Socio-Demographic Factors.—Research into the upper echelons of organisations—
notably the work of Hambrick and Mason (1984)—also discussed the link between the 
ability or capabilities of its managers and performance. Drawing from both behavioural 
conception of the firm which can be traced back to Cyert and March (1963) and an organ-
isational demography school (Pfeffer, 1983), Hambrick and Mason suggest that the ob-
servable socio-demographic characteristics of managers could be used as proxies for the 
more complex psychological dimensions of their personalities. Specifically, the authors 
synthesised a set of 21 predictions linking a number of socio-demographic individual 
attributes to organisational outcomes. The authors saw these criteria as representative of 
how different managerial capabilities determined organisational outcomes such as struc-
ture, strategic choices, or performance. The diversity in the distribution of socio-
demographic characteristics amongst team members and its consequences on managerial 
interactions and consequent firm outcomes comprised another important dimension of the 
above reflection.  
 Further research seeking the validation and the subsequent development of the 
original propositions led to the emergence of series of contributions to the topic of man-
agement team characteristics in new and in existing firms. Focusing on demographic var-
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iables of the managerial team—namely tenure, schooling, and functional background —
authors studied how its combinations and distributions in managerial teams shaped stra-
tegic corporate change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), competitive moves (Hambrick et 
al., 1996), and ultimately firm performance (Murray, 1989). In a recent review of the lit-
erature covering over twenty years of research in upper echelons characteristics Nielsen 
(2010) noted that, in spite of its popularity, attempts to investigate links between individ-
ual attributes of team members and functional outcomes still produced inconsistent find-
ings. Explanations for the inconsistencies obtained in the results range from methodolog-
ical differences to the limitations of the used proxies. In the present thesis demographic 
measures of ability are seen to be necessary but insufficient determinants of the organisa-
tional outcomes in the entrepreneurial context. The text below details the strengths and 
shortcomings of formal education and professional experience, the two most widespread 
proxies for ability. I argue for the benefits of complementing these measures with quanti-
fiable performance-based aspects of individual productivity. Special attention is given to 
the impact of prior productivity as wageworker on the success of later entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
 
Limitations of Socio-Demographic Factors.—The prevalence of a demography-based 
apparatus in the analysis of individual capabilities was advanced by Pfeffer (1983) who 
nonetheless noted that it should not be considered an end in itself. The author asserted 
that, rather than being taken as a set of causal determinants of organisational outcomes, 
demographic variables should be interpreted as a manifestation of underlying processes 
―which are considered difficult to access and measure reliably‖ (p. 351). Subsequent uti-
lisation of socio-demographic proxies in empirical the fields of entrepreneurship or top 
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management teams (TMT) was theoretically justified by its adequacy in capturing the 
unobservable determinants of organisational outcomes.  
 Observable socio-demographic variables—particularly those concerning to human 
capital—were also employed in the study of entrepreneurship and new venture perfor-
mance (see Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001 for an extended review of the subject).   Em-
pirical evidence from the literature however, produced results that were less clear than 
those obtained in TMT studies, highlighting some of the limitations of these criteria. Of 
particular relevance is the inconclusive nature of the effects of schooling on firm perfor-
mance. Formal education is a standard proxy for the measurement of human capital and 
individual ability in the economic and management literatures. Investments in education 
have been associated with improvements in worker productivity and in innovation via 
better access to information sources and superior ability to decipher new information 
(Rosenzweig, 1995). Yet, differing accounts concerning the effects of schooling on firm 
performance, particularly of new firms, have been reported. Bates (1990) and Gimeno et 
al. (1997) described a positive impact of higher levels of formal education on business 
longevity and economic performance, respectively. Stuart and Abetti (1991) and later 
Cowling (2000), on the other hand, did not find significant impacts of education on the 
performance of newly created ventures whilst Taylor (1999) was only able to find signifi-
cant results between qualification and firm longevity for those entrepreneurs who scored 
highest on academic qualification exams.  
 The signalling hypothesis provides a possible explanation for the empirical incon-
sistencies found in the relationship between formal education and firm performance. Sig-
nalling uses schooling as a mechanism to correct the informational disequilibria existing 
between a job applicant and a potential employer (Spence, 1973). The hiring process con-
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stitutes an investment made under uncertainty, as most employers will not be sure of the 
productive capabilities of the prospect employee until taking her under employment. 
Consequently, job applicants need to credibly convey information about their quality to 
potential employers. Since salaries depend on the productivity of a worker and education 
is seen as a proxy for that very same productivity, prospect employees have an incentive 
to invest in their education in order to obtain higher wages. Juxtaposed to this finding, no 
information asymmetry is found to exist in self-employment where individuals are aware 
of their own capabilities. It is then feasible to think that, while useful for assessing 
productivity as workers, formal education may not to be a reliable predictor for the suc-
cess of entrepreneurial ventures. What is more, self-selection of relatively high-
ability/low-education individuals is expected to occur in entrepreneurship when com-
pared to paid-employment. Since individuals specialise on activities that provide them 
with comparatively greater levels of output and earnings (Roy, 1951), it is expected that, 
amongst entrepreneurs, an over-representation of lesser-educated but high-ability indi-
viduals is expected to be found. Consistent with this idea are the findings from a recent 
body of work examining the employee-entrepreneur transition. Carnahan et al. (2012) 
found that workers with better business ideas often feel underpaid relative to co-workers 
with similar education and may prefer to exit wage employment and start their own firms. 
Klepper and Thompson (2010) identified strategic disagreements between employees and 
management regarding the viability of new projects as a motivator for spin-off formation.  
 Another standard measure of human capital of workers is professional experience. 
The acquisition of work experience improves productivity on the execution of firm-
specific tasks and—albeit to a lesser extent—of distinct but related activities (Dietz and 
Bozeman, 2005). Contributions from the literature of corporate spin-offs found that ven-
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tures whose founders had in the past worked in other firms operating in the same industry 
outperformed de novo entrants and dominated the market (Klepper, 2002; Klepper and 
Sleeper, 2005). The ability to extrapolate from existing experience and redeploy in a new 
context is an important but insufficient factor of entrepreneurial success. Job experience 
may contain a high degree of individual heterogeneity, which limits its transposal into an 
entrepreneurial venture. Organisational routines established and improved upon over time 
may not be easy to copy and implement in new businesses. The compensation for work 
experience can vary within industries and even within firms, making the estimation of the 
influence of experience on entrepreneurial outcomes somewhat equivocal to estimate. 
Finally, because experience builds up with firm tenure, there is a potential issue with en-
dogeneity that needs to be accounted for (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). 
 
Entrepreneurial Ability.—The shortcomings of the discussed measures of human capital 
in the context of entrepreneurial activities prompt the examination of further elements 
that contribute to the determination of new venture outcomes. Of particular usage are 
Shultz‘s (1975) assertions on human capital and market disequilibria. Tackling the ques-
tion of ability from an individual output perspective, the author noted that ―our 
knowledge of a person‘s abilities consists of inferences drawn from his performance‖ 
(p.828). Moreover, the author reasoned that the existence of economic incentives to real-
locate resources sufficed as sorting mechanism for task specialisation according to abil-
ity. A conception of ability grounded on the recurring observation of individual out-
comes—notably worker performance—over time juxtaposes with the usage of socio-
demographic attributes favoured by TMT scholars. In a similar fashion, Winter (2000) 
offered a description of managerial capabilities as being those that enable the repeated 
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and reliable performance of an activity. This compares to ad-hoc activities, which do not 
reflect practiced or patterned behaviours. The ability to consistently sustain a relative 
performance threshold helps to justify transitions from workers to entrepreneurs by facili-
tating the comparison of opportunity costs and the forming of expectations regarding new 
business opportunities outside of the current setting.  
 Both Schultz and Winter emphasised the continued observation of individual out-
puts as an essential aspect of ability measurement. Winter‘s definition of capabilities ap-
plied a causal predictability framework that can be transposed to the empirical analysis of 
the link between ability and the success of entrepreneurial ventures. The persistent char-
acter of ability in conjunction with its measurability by individually observable outcomes 
are what ultimately enables its marking and tracing by the researcher. In order to ensure 
that the assessment of entrepreneurial ability is not confounded with the business out-
comes generated by the entrepreneur, the measurement of that factor needs occur prior to 
the establishment of the venture. Careful consideration must however, be employed when 
choosing the defining the appropriate criteria for determining ability.  
 One of the issues raised by Pfeffer (1983) when proposing the adoption of simple 
demographic variables to assess managerial capabilities was the difficulty in reliably 
quantifying an unobservable. While known—or acquired over time via learning—by the 
individual, ability cannot be easily observed and therefore measured by a researcher. 
Others however perceive it too. Comparable workers with the identical levels of school-
ing, equal tenure, and the same functional background may nonetheless exhibit differ-
ences in ability, and consequently, in productivity. Since workers with consistently higher 
productivity rates have a more significant opportunity cost for their current occupation, 
employers are bound to reward these workers with better salaries in order to entice them 
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into remaining in the company. Thus, it can be established that differences in ability are 
not only known to the individual but also recognised by the employer and translated by 
variations in compensation. What is more, the better-paid workers who leave their jobs in 
order to pursue the path of entrepreneurship should expect the return on their ability to be 
higher in their new occupational choice. Implied here is the previously discussed idea of 
transferability of skills from a job as employee to one as entrepreneur. Again, self-
awareness of one‘s own ability is paramount in the understanding of occupational choice. 
The decision to voluntarily enter in entrepreneurship can be motivated by a number of 
factors—ranging from desire for greater independence to the internalisation of the locus 
of control (Shane et al., 2003)—yet it is always based on the belief of Pareto improve-
ment over the initial state. An a priori expectation of future firm success is hence a neces-
sary condition for choice of entry to occur. The following prospects of success will in 
turn be tied to the degree to which the ability of an individual allows for the identification 
and exploitation of business opportunities.  
 In the light of these arguments it is possible to obtain a quantifiable measure of 
ability that maintains an exogenous causal link between the entrepreneur and the venture 
by observing the career of the individual prior to the entry into self-employment. Higher 
ability individuals will command a wage premium relative to their co-workers. If individ-
ual ability is not fully captured by standard wage determinants—such as schooling and 
experience—then, at least some degree of wage heterogeneity is likely to persist even 
after controlling for these and other individual- and firm-level variables. We may then 
obtain a measurable and empirically testable proxy for ability by extracting the systemat-
ic difference in individual salaries from other observable factors related to both human 
capital and other more aggregate dimensions. A more detailed description of the theoreti-
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cal methodology used in the estimation of ability is developed in the Methodology sec-
tion. For now, the analysis proceeds with the introduction of embeddedness and of its 
relationship to individual ability. 
 
B. Structural Embeddedness 
Ability and Embeddedness.—Organisations exist in an economic environment cohabited 
by other firms. As open systems, they derive essential tangible and intangible resources 
from entities outside their own boundaries. They also leverage their internal competitive 
strengths through coordination with other firms (Uzzi, 1996). Thus, the external envi-
ronment and organisations comprising it are not only unavoidable; they play a prominent 
role in competitive outcomes (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Baum and Dutton, 1996).  
Embeddedness refers to the process by which on-going social relations shape and 
constrain the economic actions of individuals and organisations (Granovetter, 1985). Em-
beddedness relates to entrepreneurial ability by defining the network of ties in which in-
dividuals interact and information circulates. As access to private information and 
knowledge sharing are more frequent to those who develop stronger ties, awareness of 
nascent business opportunities is improved (Ozgen and Baron, 2007). The degree of em-
beddedness in a network thus defines the boundary condition, or the extent to which, an 
entrepreneur is able to exert her capabilities. Embeddedness therefore leverages the struc-
ture and quality of interpersonal ties in order to facilitate the creation if an exchange sys-
tem with unique opportunities relative to markets (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1996). Re-
search in embeddedness points to critical information and learning benefits (Haunschild, 
1993; Westphal et al., 2001), as well as relational assets, notably trust and access, that not 
only enhance the ability of the organisation to procure critical resources (Pfeffer, 1983), 
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but play an important part in the successful implementation of selected strategies 
(Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011).  
 Traditionally, researchers have categorised embeddedness into four broader cate-
gories: cognitive, cultural, structural, and political (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Of these, 
structural embeddedness is of particular interest in the context of the present analysis as it 
emphasises the contextualisation of the dynamic patterns of interpersonal relations and its 
effects on economic outcomes. Structurally embedded actors benefit from a central stra-
tegic position in a network by virtue of being involved in many significant ties (Wasser-
man, 1994). Differences in the degree to which network agents are structurally embedded 
lead to asymmetries in the access to informational and social capital resources controlled 
by firms (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Benefiting from their centrality, structurally 
embedded actors are able to circumvent costly market mechanisms which outsiders have 
to resort to. For example, a more central position in a vertical network of cooperative 
relations, say with suppliers, translates into a resource advantage and, thence, into a po-
tential competitive advantage. Moreover, the network serves as a search and monitoring 
mechanism for each the strategies and actions of others, increasing, in the process, the 
cognitive salience of some competitors relative to others. 
 
Transaction and Reputation Costs.—The extent to which information can be disseminat-
ed across a network is dependent on the strength of the existing ties between its members 
(Hansen, 1999). The establishment and consolidation of social ties enriches the size and 
depth of one‘s own network increasing the potential for the sharing of private information 
and cooperation (Granovetter, 1973). Since, by definition, outsiders have limited number 
of ties within a network, access to such information is constrained, or subject to costly 
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acquisition. As embedded agents are exempted from the temporal and pecuniary costs 
associated with the access to network-specific information, distinction between this group 
and outsiders with fewer interpersonal and interfirm ties is bound to occur. The resulting 
effect causes a liability of outsidership (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) that can be under-
stood under the light of a transaction cost framework.  A transaction cost is the cost asso-
ciated with the participation in a market (Williamson, 1981).  The set of relationships 
maintained by embedded agent have a given value that is network-specific and therefore 
subject to alteration, should that agent be redeployed in a new environment (Uzzi, 1999). 
That value, of which search and informational costs are examples, is the transaction cost 
that an outsider will face when entering a new network. 
In interfirm alliances, repeated interactions through time breed familiarity and in-
crease trust in partners (Gulati, 1995). Dore (1983) observed the same effect in the Japa-
nese textile industry and referred to it as goodwill. The author further remarked that the 
repeated interaction and the close-knit ties that subsequently developed along the supply 
chain did in fact contribute to overall efficiency of the firm. As the repeated negotiations 
of business relationships between market agents are inefficient and complex—due to the 
unique character of factor inputs—and cost associated with in-house development is pro-
hibitively large, firms often benefit in developing lasting relationships with partners. Out-
siders, on the other hand, need to develop ties with members of a network from the 
ground up, a process that is often based on the establishment of reputations (Buckley and 
Casson, 1998). By establishing and perfecting organisational routines that are socially 
embedded in an environment, firms are more likely to build resources and capabilities 




Geography and Embeddedness.—Location decisions are representative of the structural 
embeddedness of firms. Two contrary forces are at work for outsider firms that move into 
a new location. On the one hand, outsiders have to endure the aforementioned transac-
tional and reputation costs from which locals are exempted. On the other hand, however, 
outsiders may benefit from a source of innovation that can supply them with a competi-
tive edge over rivals. 
Research has also shown the relationship between geography and embeddedness 
to hold at a more local level. For example, Dore (1983) and Romo and Schwartz (1995) 
have studied the embeddedness of textile manufacturers in regional production networks 
and observed strong levels of dependency on the local milieu. Transposing the same 
analysis to the field of entrepreneurship, Figueiredo et al. (2002) found nascent entrepre-
neurs to be so keen on remaining in their prior area of business location that they were 
willing to accept labour costs over three times higher. The extent to which an entrepre-
neur will go in order to remain in a familiar environment may be justified by two com-
plementary motives. These are, respectively, spill-over effects and transaction costs.  
 Local entrepreneurs face no explicit costs to access their social and cultural envi-
ronments (Caves, 1996). An incumbent in a given geography is more familiar with its 
networks and therefore disposes of greater social capital that can be employed on the at-
tainment of a comparative advantage over its rivals (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). By 
juxtaposition, when an investor extends the operations of a firm beyond the familiar 
boundaries of his or her home location, that investor is incurring in a fixed transaction 
cost—the described cost associated with a market exchange. Specifically, any newcomer 
in a geographic market will need to costly search and acquire access to private infor-
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mation of strategic utility that may well be freely available to embedded actors 
(Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011). 
 Alternatively, too much embeddedness may create its own set of problems. Uzzi 
(1996) suggested that over-embeddedness can lead to feuding, choking-off of novel in-
formation from other parts of the industry, and welfare-like support of weak network 
members. Essentially, over-reliance on strong ties contributes to isolation by external 
barring innovation that enters the network via a flow of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).  
By contrast, since outsiders can have different conceptions of social norms and attitudes, 
there is a greater likelihood for this group to identify and tap into arbitrage opportunities 
that were unnoticed by locals (Hennart, 2007). For example, Siegel et al. (2014) found 
that American firms operating in Korea exploited societal bigotry against employing 
women by hiring a larger share of female managers and thus ensuring a more competitive 
cost structure vis-à-vis rivals. 
The optimal level of structural embeddedness in terms of overall fitness of the 
network may then fall within an intermediate range where parties are neither too tightly 
connected to fragmented social connections nor so loosely connected that they are una-
ware of who has information to provide, or who knows whom in order to request the in-
formation. One setting in which the too little/too much embeddedness dichotomy is of 
particular importance is that of the international firm. Researchers in international busi-
ness have long theorised about a liability of foreignness, that is, the costs multinational 
enterprises doing business abroad face as a result of their unfamiliarity with local envi-
ronments (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). Internationalising firms need to adapt to different 
contexts whenever leaving their home country. In doing so, these firms will face a liabil-
ity of foreignness, a term describing the additional costs faced by firms operating outside 
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their home countries experience. Similar in essence to the issues affecting other outsiders 
to a network, foreigners will incur in costs originated in their limited local knowledge and 
potentially face discriminatory attitudes from local stakeholders (Nachum, 2010). Zaheer 
(1995) found that while foreign firms tend to possess a source of competitive advantage 
over their native rivals, the capabilities required to enact such advantage can be difficult 
to identify and to copy or acquire. Johanson and Vahlne (1977), Kogut and Singh (1988), 
and later Barkema et al. (1996) have also reported on the cultural barriers firms face 
when expanding internationally and the ‖double layered acculturation‖ processes re-
quired for learning and effectively competing in foreign markets.  In practice though, and 
in spite of the challenges and costs that would not otherwise be faced, economic agents 
actively abandon their native milieux in order to seek new business opportunities else-
where. Entrepreneurs may seek markets where their skills and resources are scarcer and 
more valuable (Deephouse, 1999). In a meta-analysis of over 120 studies Kirca et al. 
(2011) concluded that internationalisation enabled companies to access higher returns 
than they would had they remained in their domestic domain. The key, the authors ar-
gued, lied in the effective transfer of firm-specific assets to a foreign context.  
The findings described in the last paragraph are representative of the similarities 
found when comparing foreignness to outsidership. At the centre of each of the two phe-
nomena lies a trade-off that weighs in the benefits derived from the control of outsider-








The following chapter develops and elicits a set of the testable hypotheses relating entre-
preneurial ability and structural embeddedness to new business performance and to the 
likelihoods of firm transfer or closure. First, I will examine how ability—defined as the 
ex-ante productivity in paid-employment—and embeddedness—the physical distance 
from the old workplace—relate to a set of performance dimensions of subsequently cre-
ated ventures. The effect for how embeddedness in as environment serves as a mediator 
for ability is also tested with the interaction between the two variables. Afterwards, 
comes the analysis of the decisions to keep, transfer, or close a venture. Two different 
sets of hypotheses regarding these decisions are tested: one set assessing the role of op-
portunity cost and another measuring the impact of embeddedness. Finally, I follow the 
career paths of entrepreneurs leaving a venture for other occupations in self- or paid-
employment. The goal here is to seek for patterns of specialisation into serial entrepre-
neurship, particularly in those individuals with higher levels of ability. 
 
A. Firm Performance 
Entrepreneurial Ability.— Ability is defined as a human capital factor la Schultz (1975), 
that is, a set of heterogeneously distributed skills that allow for the superior identification 
and development of business opportunities in an ever-changing environment. A nexus 
between emergent business opportunities and enterprising individuals is therefore crucial 
for the understanding of the dynamics associated with entrepreneurial activity (Venkata-
raman, 1997), as is the variation in the ability, or quality, to identify these opportunities 
(Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). Individuals employ differing degrees of ability to ―discov-
er, evaluate, and exploit‖ (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000: p.218) opportunities present-
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ed by new goods, services, raw materials, and organising methods. The exploitation of 
opportunities can be operationalised in self-employment with the creation of a new firm, 
or pursued within the framework of an existing organisation (Casson, 1982; Eckhardt and 
Shane, 2003).  The case of the latter is exemplary of the value of knowledge-based re-
sources—such as entrepreneurial ability—to established organisations and is reflected in 
the superior compensations offered to the workers who control these resources (Wiklund 
and Shepherd, 2003). 
 The acknowledgement that the ability to exploit emerging opportunities is a 
scarce resource valued by organisations provides us with means of exogenously assessing 
individual ability prior to entry in entrepreneurship. As Becker (1975) pointed out in his 
theory of human capital, individuals with greater levels of general human capital will be 
more mobile in the labour markets, as their skills tend to become applicable to a larger 
cross-section of organisations. Entrepreneurial ability fits this definition of general human 
capital and may hence be interpreted as such. Ability, although not observed by the re-
searcher, is known by the person and evidenced in the respective level of productivity. 
With time, information asymmetries regarding the quality of the worker are mitigated and 
employers improve their knowledge about worker productivity. As a consequence, earned 
wages will, amongst other factors, reflect the individual ability. This ability can then be 
estimated as the wage differentials from otherwise comparable workers after controlling 
for other relevant wage determinants. Since virtually all entrepreneurs have, at some 
point in time, engaged in paid-employment activities, the proposed notion of ability can 
be tested as a component of general human capital that is time-persistent and therefore 
transposable from between occupations. Since the observation of each future person as 
worker occurs before the creation of the first entrepreneurial venture, the researcher is 
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then able to exogenously examine the impact of previously estimated ability on firm per-
formance. Specifically, I predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 1)    Prior productivity as wage-worker is positively affects the performance 
of firms created as an entrepreneur. 
 
Structural Embeddedness.—A second factor associated with ability that also influences 
the performance of entrepreneurial ventures is the degree of structural embeddedness of a 
person in a given milieu. Structural embeddedness emphasises the contextualisation of 
the dynamic patterns of interpersonal relations and its effects on economic outcomes 
(Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Structurally embedded actors benefit from a central strate-
gic position in a network by virtue of being involved in many significant ties (Wasser-
man, 1994). Outsiders, by contrast, are hampered with uncertainty concerning any pre-
existing environmental conditions and network relationships (Johanson and Vahlne, 
2006). The challenges that newcomers are faced with and have to overcome are particu-
larly evident in the internationalisation process of corporations. These arise in part from 
being unembedded in local social networks, from insufficient integration with the exist-
ing information network (Mezias, 2002), and from a ―lack of roots in a local environ-
ment‖ (Zaheer, 1995: p.343), compounded by a perceived deficiency in the legitimacy of 
a foreign firm in the host country.  
 The distinctive characteristics of outsiders to a milieu are not unique to foreigners, 
but rather rooted on the uncertainty of those who are not affiliated with a network (Johan-
son and Vahlne, 2009). For the prospect entrant, the lack of market-specific business 
knowledge and relevant network positions constitutes action liability of outsidership 
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(Rugman and Verbeke, 2007).  Any entrepreneur entering a new market will incur in a 
fixed external transaction cost, the cost of market participation. Specifically, new entrants 
will need to costly search and acquire information that may well be freely available to 
local actors. Also, entrepreneurs seek legitimacy to reduce perceived risk by associating 
with, or by obtaining explicit certification from, well-regarded individuals and organisa-
tions (Shane and Cable, 2002).  In order to gain legitimacy, organisations find that they 
must learn how to conform to the social patterns and behaviours of dominant actors in 
their environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Entrants will need to expend resources in 
establishing a reputation by conveying information about the quality of the assets em-
ployed to other market participants (Buckley and Casson, 1998). This process signifies a 
time expenditure, as the signalling of reputations is solidified through repeated interper-
sonal and inter-organisational relations within a network.  
 In the uncertain and dynamic conditions under which entrepreneurial activity oc-
curs, resource holders—particularly potential investors and employees—are bound to 
seek information that helps to gauge the underlying potential of a venture (Hoang and 
Antoncic, 2003) The difficulties outsiders face in order to overcome information asym-
metries about their quality and credibility goes so far as limiting the mobility of entrepre-
neurs. Figueiredo et al. (2002) found that entrepreneurs were willing to accept labour 
costs over 3 times higher in their local regions. The authors associated this home-field 
bias to the value of non-transferrable assets, namely the networks of institutions and rela-
tionships of trust among economic actors that develop within local cultures. 
 The information asymmetries associated with both the transaction costs and other 
non-transferrable assets, for example—reputation, put outsiders in a position of natural 
disadvantage against not only established firms but also against other new ventures creat-
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ed by insiders to the network. Since such costs constitute an important liability for outsid-
ers to overcome, I hypothesise that:  
 
Hypothesis 2a)    Structural embeddedness in a network has a positive impact on the 
performance of new firms. 
 
 In practice though, and in spite of the challenges and costs that would not other-
wise be faced, economic agents abandon their native milieux in order to seek new busi-
ness opportunities elsewhere. Granovetter (1973) noted that whilst the dissemination of 
existing information is more prevalent in agents who have developed strong interpersonal 
ties, novel information is introduced into a network from its fringes by agents with weak 
or no ties to those near the core of the system. According to this interpretation, instead of 
being taken as a liability, lack of embeddedness is an asset and signals the attempt of an 
entrepreneur to exploit an arbitrage opportunity. Informational asymmetry still exists but 
benefits insightful outsiders with new ideas rather of insiders with a sound knowledge of 
the milieu. Entrepreneurs enter in new, unfamiliar networks in order to fill gaps in market 
opportunities (Casson, 1982). Outsiders who control scarce resources of complex replica-
tion may be able to capture and sustain a competitive advantage over locals even when 
embeddedness within the local network of ties is insufficient. This is the arbitrage role of 
the entrepreneur—using scarce skills and resources, entrepreneurs discover and exploit 
business opportunities ignored by existing network insiders (Deephouse, 1999). What is 
more, newcomers to a network may have increased room to manoeuvre, as they are not 
bounded by, and hence need not to conform with, existing social norms and attitudes 
(Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). Uzzi (1996) suggested that over-embeddedness can lead 
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to feuding, choking off of novel information from other parts of the industry, and wel-
fare-like support of weak network members. By contrast, outsiders may be able to enjoy a 
profit advantage by exploiting local inefficiencies based on culture-specific conventions 
and norms (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). Siegel et al. found an example of this exploita-
tive behaviour (2014) in American firms operating in Korea. These firms successful used 
the prevalent bigotry against women in the host society to their own benefit by employing 
a larger share of female managers and thus ensuring greater competitiveness in their cost 
structure vis-à-vis local rivals. 
 As described, entrepreneurs who have the intention of entering a new milieu need 
to weigh in the benefits derived from the control of valuable assets against the liabilities 
associated with their outsidership. Following this argument, entry only takes place when 
the expected pay-offs of the former surpasses the estimated costs of the latter. The real-
ised entry then credibly demonstrates the belief of the entrepreneur concerning the exist-
ence of the basis for a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). In spite of po-
tential cognitive biases—explained by factors such as the lack of embeddedness in an 
environment (Johanson and Vahlne, 2006) or the over-optimism in regard to business 
outcomes (Cooper et al., 1988; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006)—entrepreneurs who anticipate 
that the control of specific resources and capabilities will grant them the basis for a sus-
tainable competitive advantage will still decide to enter a new market, so that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b)    Structural embeddedness in a network has a negative impact on the 
performance of new firms. 
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 In addition to its first order effect on the performance of newly created ventures, 
structural embeddedness also conditions the range of how individuals may exert their 
entrepreneurial ability. Embeddedness affects the extent and effectiveness of entrepre-
neurial ability by delimiting the boundaries of the social networks within which individu-
als act. Informational asymmetries between economic agents constrain or enhance the 
knowledge of, and subsequent access to, novel business opportunities (Casson, 1982). 
Environmental alertness required for successful opportunity exploitation (Kirzner, 1999) 
can therefore be interpreted as a mediator for entrepreneurial ability.  
As social networks affect the flow and quality of disseminated information (Gran-
ovetter, 2005), it can be conceived that agents with stronger interpersonal ties are better 
prepared to correctly assess the merits and pitfalls of a given opportunity. In this case, 
embeddedness acts as a natural amplifier to entrepreneurial ability increasing the infor-
mational input and broadening the horizon of opportunities that can be acted upon. For-
malising, we have that:  
 
Hypothesis 3)    Structural embeddedness has a positive mediating impact on entrepre-
neurial ability and consequently on the performance of new firms. 
 
B. Continue, Transfer, or Close 
Different Forms of Exit.—Recent contributions to the study of entrepreneurial dynamics 
have sought to emphasise the distinction between the departure of the entrepreneur from a 
venture by closure or by the transfer of its control to another businessperson (Headd, 
2003; Bates, 2005; Wennberg et al., 2010). Fortune and Mitchell (2012) argued that busi-
ness dissolution entails a selection process that removes both the entrepreneur and his 
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underlying capabilities from the landscape, while the transfer of a firm represents a selec-
tion process that removes the corporate entity whilst preserving some of its organisational 
capabilities within the economic environment. The persistence of organisational capabili-
ties after the departure of the founder is significant in that it serves as a measure of the 
expected quality of a firm to a buyer. Buyers invest in vintage capital that retains some of 
its value and by doing so they free-up resources that the seller allocates to the pursuit of 
nascent opportunities elsewhere (Penrose, 1959; Chari and Hopenhayn, 1991). Hence, the 
transfer process facilitates the division of labour in the entrepreneurial market as the 
highest ability individuals choose to specialise in firm creation and the lesser able to fo-
cus on the management of already existing firms (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). 
 
Entrepreneurial Ability.—On the other hand, firms managed by lesser able entrepreneurs 
face a greater risk of discontinuance, because of its relative inefficiency, and a lower 
probability of transfer, as buyers choose better performing ventures and the opportunity 
cost of the entrepreneur are lower. The link between the business transfer probability and 
the ability of the entrepreneur can therefore be formalised by the hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4)    Entrepreneurial ability increases the likelihood of business transfer. 
 
But what about firms which are neither closed nor transferred? The set of firms 
who remain in operation through time under the same management account for the major-
ity of the total population, so how do they compare to the remaining businesses and who 
ends up running them? Population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989), evolu-
tionary theorists (Nelson and Winter, 2002), and industrial organisation scholars (Gort 
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and Klepper, 1982; Agarwal and Gort, 1996) have repeatedly sustained the argument that 
the least efficient firms in an industry will, over time, be selected out of a market. In 
comparison, surviving firms will be those that satisfy the efficiency condition—at least to 
the extent that guarantees their subsistence. As noted in an early remark by Penrose: “pos-
itive profits can be treated as the criterion of natural selection—the firms that make prof-
its are selected or ‘adopted‘ by the environment, others are rejected and disappear‖ (Pen-
rose, 1952: p.810).  
The adoption of biological analogies and its translation in the context and theory 
of the firm aid in the argument that businesses ran by lesser capable entrepreneurs face 
higher chances of closure. According to this perspective, firm performance and longevity 
are co-determined by the managerial ability of the entrepreneur, which is why closure is 
often interpreted as a failure. A quick survey of the literature in entrepreneurial success 
demonstrates the prevalence of this view, with a number of contributions using human 
capital inputs, usually level of schooling and experience, as determinants of the success 
of new firm success, measured as survival (Bates, 1990; Holmes and Schmitz, 1996; 
Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003; Dahl and Reichstein, 2007). Following this view, it can be 
predicted that, due to the positive effect of ability on business quality and hence longevi-
ty: 
 
Hypothesis 5a)   Entrepreneurial ability decreases the likelihood of business closure. 
 
An alternative approach to the relationship between the survival of new firms and 
the ability of the entrepreneur uses the notion of opportunity cost as the major driver for 
explaining business closure. Entrepreneurs with better outside alternatives will be more 
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likely to discontinue their businesses if they are unable to sell them, while those with 
fewer or no external alternatives will tend to hold on for longer (Arora and Nandkumar, 
2011). Discontinuance can hence come as the result of the choice to act upon rising op-
portunities in the outside world instead of the failure of the fundamentals of a business 
(Penrose, 1959).  
It should be clarified that the distinction between closure by insufficient economic 
performance and closure as means to pursuit other alternatives is explained with the het-
erogeneity in entrepreneurial ability. Individuals with higher ability will benefit from 
better external options and will attempt to transfer their firms in order to free-up the nec-
essary time and capital resources to act upon those opportunities. Their ventures may, 
however, fail to attract the attention of prospect buyers, even if their fundamentals are 
sound enough to guarantee the survival of the business (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). In 
the event the latter possibility occurs, the entrepreneurs will need to weigh-in the oppor-
tunity cost of maintaining the current venture versus the option to discontinue it in order 
to follow other opportunities (Gimeno et al., 1997). A decision to exit by firm closure 
will reveal a mismatch between the present market value of individual ability and the 
quality of the created venture (Holmes and Schmitz, 1995). Notice that this does not im-
ply that the quality of the created business is independent from the ability of the entrepre-
neur. Instead, as new opportunities continuously rise, market conditions change and so 
does the relative value of individual ability and/or of the quality of the firm. Lucas (1978) 
partially anticipated this effect in his model of industry evolution, explaining business 
closure as a voluntary change by entrepreneurs who shift to paid-employment where 
wages have become more attractive. 
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A relevant side-effect of this decision is the possibility that a relatively efficient 
business is discontinued, not for lack of sustainability of its operations, but by its inability 
to generate a rate of return that is sufficiently high for the entrepreneur to keep it (Arora 
and Nandkumar, 2011). By contrast, it is conceivable that other lower quality firms re-
main in operation, as their owners will not have access to better external alternatives. 
Should the effect of opportunity cost dominate over the impact of entrepreneurial ability 
on firm survival, we will have a competing hypothesis formalised as: 
 
Hypothesis 5b)   Entrepreneurial ability increases the likelihood of business closure. 
 
Structural Embeddedness.—The expected impact of structural embeddedness, or lack of, 
on the probabilities of business transfer or closure is consistent with the aforementioned 
link between network ties and the flow of information in an environment. Researchers in 
international business have long theorised about a liability of foreignness, that is, the 
costs multinational enterprises doing business abroad face as a result of their unfamiliari-
ty with local environments (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). More recent contributions by 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) generalised the set of transaction costs incurred by those 
entering networks they are unfamiliar with as a belonging to a broader liability of outsid-
ership. Outsiders need to develop ties with members of a network from the ground up, a 
process that is often based on the establishment of reputations (Buckley and Casson, 
1998), a time- and capital-consuming process. By definition, outsiders simultaneously 
have fewer strong ties, which have the advantage of facilitating information exchange, 
and a smaller network of contacts to draw upon, which limits the scope of potential busi-
ness buyers. Adding-up the two factors, one effectively obtains an entrepreneur who, in-
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spite of her level of individual ability, will only have access to a limited, ill-informed 
network of prospect buyers. It is therefore theorised that, for any given level of ability: 
 
Hypothesis 6)    Structural embeddedness increases the likelihood of business transfer. 
 
Hypothesis 7)    Structural embeddedness decreases the likelihood of business closure. 
 
C. Entrepreneurial Specialisation 
Specialisation into Serial Entrepreneurship.—The first hypothesis developed in the pre-
sent section speculated on the theoretical relationship concerning past levels of productiv-
ity exhibited by future entrepreneurs and the performance of subsequently created ven-
tures. From there, I derived a further number of hypotheses relating both individual abil-
ity and structural embeddedness to entrepreneurial outcomes. Within this framework, the 
alertness in regard to new emerging opportunities and its exploitation by entrepreneurs 
plays a transversal part in the analysis of distinct mechanisms for individual action rang-
ing from the division of labour to the opportunity cost of competing alternatives. In par-
ticular, differences exist in the individual competences required for the performance of 
different entrepreneurial tasks as the founding of new firms or the management of already 
established organisations. 
Entrepreneurship is not confined to process of starting of new business (Cooper et 
al., 1988), nor is it a one-shot occurrence (Birley and Westhead 1993). As discussed, in-
dividuals may enter entrepreneurship via transfer, that is, the acquisition or the inher-
itance of an existing business. Entrepreneurs differentiate themselves from other market 
actors in the way they perceive business opportunities (Venkataraman, 1997; Ucbasaran 
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et al., 2007). Kirzner (1979) asserted that the entrepreneurs were cognitively different and 
were driven by a sense of environmental alertness, which consisted of a set of perceptual 
and cognitive processing skills that navigate and facilitate the mapping of nascent busi-
ness opportunities. The ability to identify emerging opportunities before others do con-
sists of a valuable resource capable of delivering a competitive advantage over rivals 
(Gaglio and Katz, 2001). It is the basis of what was described before as entrepreneurial 
ability and hence expected to be reflected in the performance of firms created by those 
with higher levels of this resource. Consequently, individuals who control this ability 
have an incentive to specialise in opportunity identification, which in practice is opera-
tionalised via the cyclic process of business creation-transfer-creation. What is more, the 
imprinting of founders on an organisation persists long after their departure from the or-
ganisation, with its consequences being noted not only on the culture and knowledge 
(Argote et al., 2003) but also on the longevity of the firm (Nelson, 2003; Geroski et al., 
2010).  
 Two implications rise from what was presented in the last paragraph. First, that 
higher ability leads to specialisation into serial entrepreneurship because of the superior 
comparative value of creating new firms vis-à-vis managing existing ones. Second, that 
the influence exerted by the founder on the firm outlasts her tenure there, making ven-
tures started by more apt individuals more attractive to potential buyers and thus easier to 
benefit from when the founder leaves. Therefore, we expect to find a relatively high por-
tion of entrepreneurs with higher levels of ability amongst those who engage in serial 
entrepreneurship, that is, those who habitually engage in the development of new ven-
tures in a sequential manner. Hence:      
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V. Data and Methods 
 
A. Data 
The data used in the present work is constructed from two different sources. First, the 
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) set, a longitudinal linked employer-employee survey conducted 
by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment to every firm employing paid-labour in man-
ufacturing. Compiled on a yearly basis, the QP survey contains detailed information on a 
number of characteristics of firms and the individuals working at them. The survey has a 
mandatory character with all firms employing paid labour being legally required to regis-
ter, regardless of industry, size, or legal form. The source does not cover the self-
employed who do not employ any other persons, but aside than these, it provides a com-
prehensive overview of the economy. The series ranges from 1985 to 2009 with firms and 
individuals being tracked through time via a system of unique identifiers.  
 A second source, provided by the Portuguese Directorate-General for the Territo-
ry, was used in the measurement of the physical distance across municipalities. The dis-
tance between the location of the current venture of an entrepreneur and the location of 
the firm where the individual worked prior to the start of the first self-employment spell 
served as a proxy for the level of embeddedness in a given milieu. 
The following subsection provides an exploratory analysis of the data sources and 
respective dependent, explanatory, and control variables employed in the empirical mod-
els. A theoretical contextualisation of their choice to study entrepreneurial phenomena is 
also developed. Table 1, compiles a summary of the major variables employed in the pre-
sent work. Ability, the variable linking past productivities to entrepreneurial outcomes is 
estimated from a high-dimensional fixed effects wage regression model for the years 
1985 – 1991 detailed in the Methodology subsection and theoretically developed in the 
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preceding chapters. Therefore, whilst the data for the Ability variable were estimated 
prior to the observation of the 1994 – 2009 panel, its application is done in the subsequent 
study of entrepreneurial success. 
 
Table 1—Summary of Variables Employed  
Variable Definition 
Ability Individual fixed-effect from HDFE wage regression (1985 – 
1991); Estimation details are presented in the Methodology 
section 
Distance (km) Distance between the geodesic centres of the last observed 
municipality as worker and current municipality as entrepre-
neur 
Outsider Dummy variable equal to 1 if last municipality as worker is 
different and not adjacent to current municipality as entrepre-
neur 
Schooling Years of schooling of the individual 
Age Age of the individual 
Prior Experience Dummy variable equal to 1for those with at least one previ-
ous self-employment spell  
Necessity Dummy variable equal to 1for those who started a firm after 
the exit from paid-employment was due to business discon-
tinuation  
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if male 
Foreign Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign 
No. Work Number of workers employed in the firm, log of in estimation 
Sales Revenues Deflated sales revenues, log of in estimation 
Labour Growth  Yearly variation in number of workers, yearly difference of 
logs in estimation 
Sales Growth Yearly variation in sales revenues, yearly difference of logs in 
estimation 
Firm age Age of the firm at year t 
Closure Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm closure on year t 




The Quadros de Pessoal Survey.—Most of the data used in the present dissertation origi-
nates on the QP survey. Both firm- and individual-level data were taken from this source 
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in the construction of the final data-set. Firm-level data includes the number of workers 
employed, sales revenues, industry of activity and the municipality where its branches are 
located. Individual-level variables include professional information and socio-
demographic characteristics. The former comprises of wages earned as paid-workers, 
prior entrepreneurial experience, and a proxy for necessity entrepreneurship. The latter is 
divided into age, gender, level of schooling, and nationality. 
 One differentiating factor of the QP data set is the very long temporal frame cov-
ered in its series. This characteristic makes the survey especially suitable for the purposes 
of the present analysis. The estimation of the proxy for entrepreneurial ability can only be 
done if the same individuals are distinctively observed in paid- and in self-employment, 
as the measure of ability depends on evaluation of productivity made by a former em-
ployer via a wage. To achieve this, the data were severed into a couple of subseries: one 
commencing in 1985 through 1991 and a second ranging from 1994 to 2009. The gap 
corresponding to the years 1992 and 1993 serves a buffer to ensure a clear cut-off point 
between the observations in the two sets. 
The first subset takes all active firms and respective workers during the 1985-
1991 period and estimates high-dimensional fixed-effects wage regression model from 
which the proxy for entrepreneurial ability is estimated. A detailed discussion of the es-
timation procedure for the variable can be found in the Methodology section of this chap-
ter. Because of estimation requirements of the high-dimensional fixed-effects method, 
only individuals with at least two years of data during the period were included in the 
analysis. In the end, the panel followed 2,871,053 employees and 207,259 companies 
over 7 years for a grand total of 8,489,053 observations.  
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Individuals were subsequently followed into the second part of the panel in order 
to observe those who started new ventures. A unique identifier number for individuals 
and firms allowed for the longitudinal tracking of the fates of each. Only firms created 
after 1993 by individuals observed in the previous panel were considered. This amounts 
to a total of fifteen firm cohorts. The individual-level data for the year of 2001 is missing 
from the set making it impossible to unambiguously identify the founder(s) of companies 
in that year.  
The 1994 – 2009 panel is made of firms managed by no more than one entrepre-
neur at any given point in time. This restriction facilitates the observation of a business 
transfer between entrepreneurs, albeit at the cost of a systematic selection of what are 
mostly larger firms with more than a single owner. Also, as the pool of workers for whom 
ability was estimated remains constant through time, the number of new firms entering 
the market will be relatively small in the first and final years of the sampling. The data 
pattern can be understood if one considers that during the first years of observation only a 
portion of individuals will have made the transition from worker to entrepreneur whilst in 
the latter of analysis most of the sampled individuals will already have started their own 
companies or exited the market altogether.  
The data are right-censored and ends on 2009 for all firms, irrespective of their 
starting time, and that means that the maximum potential age that individual firms can 
reach is different for each cohort. Whereas firms from the 1994 cohort can reach a maxi-
mum of fifteen years of life, the ones from the 2008 cohort can reach, at most, two years.   
The IGEO Data-Set.—The Informação Geográfica (IGEO) data set comprises infor-
mation on the distances between geodesic points within each of 308 Portuguese munici-
palities, which are local administrative units. Of these, 178 are located in mainland Por-
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tugal each with an average population of 6,500 inhabitants. Mainland Portugal has a 
small area with less than 92,000 square-kilometres and a longest straight-line distance at 
600 kilometres.  With a relatively large number of municipalities for such an area, a great 
degree of granularity in the localisation of the individuals before and after the start of a 
new venture is possible. Whilst even more detailed information identifying the firm loca-
tion by civil parish, the lowest level administrative unit in Portugal, was available in the 
IGEO data set, the QP survey only included this information from 2002 onwards. The 
choice was then to sacrifice small amount of precision on measure of distance maintain 
so that a longer series with more firm cohorts could be followed. 
Distances between municipalities were calculated from the geodesic centre of the 
administrative capital town or city of each municipality to all other locations. This pro-
duces a matrix of distances that was merged into the QP survey via a variable that was 
present on both sources, a unique municipality three-digit code. From there, it was possi-
ble to locate both the last municipality the person was observed on while being a worker 
as well as the place of the venture the same individual developed activities as an entre-
preneur. Knowing these two locations then allowed for the retrieval of the distance pro-
vided by the IGEO matrix. 
  
Dependent Variables.—Hypotheses 1 through 3 relate ability and individual embed-
dedness to the performance of the venture created by the entrepreneur. For hypotheses 4 
to 8, the likelihood of each studied event is measured by the conditional probability of its 
specific occurrence. Market performance is measured by the initial firm size and subse-
quent rate of growth. Initial firm size is measured by the natural logarithms of the number 
of employees and the deflated sales revenues, respectively.  Growth is defined as the an-
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nual logarithmic changes on each of these variables. Firm size in an industry context 
serves as a proxy for economic performance by capturing the efficiencies and market 
power associated with employing a larger number of workers and controlling a larger 
share of the market (Marshall and Weiss, 1967). Ceteris paribus, large firms have all of 
the options of small firms, and, in addition, they can invest in lines requiring such scale 
that small firms are excluded (Baumol, 1959). Additionally, by observing firms at entry 
we are ensuring that no selectivity associated with a survival bias takes place in the data. 
Performance measures based on size rather than profit also benefit from being less prone 
to misreporting by firm managers. Recent evidence on corporate tax evasion (Beck et al., 
2014) has highlighted some limitations regarding the reliability of profitability-based 
measures of performance on smaller firms. It should nonetheless be noted, that whilst 
using sales revenues—which is a component of profitability—in the statistical analysis, it 
is unlikely that a systematic bias in this variable persists in the data. Respondents of the 
QP survey are explicitly guaranteed anonymity and legal confidentiality in their answers, 
a measure designed to mitigate misreporting of revenues for tax avoidance schemes. 
The descriptive statistics for number of employees and sales revenues reported on 
Table 2 are not linearized in order to facilitate the interpretation. At just over 5 workers, 
single-owner firms employ a relatively small number of individuals and earn an average 
of less than €260,000 per year. These values are pooled for all firm ages and compare to 
an entry size of 3.08 workers and less than €165,000 in revenues for the first year of ac-
tivity. A brief analysis of the total firm population during the same period reveals the 
mean number of workers to be approximately 9 and deflated yearly revenues at €283,000. 
 Firm growth is intrinsically associated with firm size, particularly in small firms 
(Evans, 1987a) and is a widely adopted measure of performance (see Bitici et al., 2011 
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for a recent review). According to a meta-analysis of 55 articles by Delmar (2006), varia-
tions in sales turnover and personnel each account for roughly 30% of the employed in 
the literature. Faster growing firms are able to seize positions of competitors and increase 
market power (Evans, 1987b). Higher growth rates also attributable to an improved un-
derstanding of current market conditions and a more accurate prediction of changes in 
those conditions (Birley and Westhead, 1990). The potential survival bias present in firm 
growth data—there is no growth data for discontinued firms—is accounted for with the 
Heckman (1979) selection procedure detailed on the Methodology section of the present 
chapter. 
 
Table 2—Descriptive Statistics (1994 – 2009) 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Ability 208,848 0.00 2.56 -13.72 8.37 
Distance (km) 208,848 25.03 67.17 0.00 483.25 
Outsider 208,848 0.09 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Schooling 208,848 8.61 3.80 0.00 16.00 
Age 208,848 43.53 8.37 18.00 93.00 
Prior Venture 208,848 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Necessity 208,848 0.09 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Male 208,848 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Foreign 208,848 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
No. Workers 208,848 5.28 38.90 1.00 12,015 
Sales Rev. 207,656 256,182 916,785 0.00 28,000,000 
Firm age 208,848 4.80 3.49 1.00 16.00 
Transfer 208,848 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Closure 208,848 0.09 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Growth Work.  142,423 0.01 0.38 -4.47 4.48 
Growth Sales 142,423 0.01 0.04 -0.17 18.62 
 
Table 3 disaggregates the two studied types of firm growth rates across age co-
horts. The table shows growth rates declining with increases in firm age. A couple of ex-
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planations can account for this phenomenon. First, growth rates are, in absolute terms, 
smaller for larger companies. Consequently, and since firms grow with, older firms tend 
to be larger in size and hence grow less as they age. Second, financing constraints of new 
ventures tend to be gradually lifted with firm age (Cabral and Mata, 2003). This effect is 
responsible for the more robust growth rates observed during the earlier years of the life 
of firms. With time however, companies approximate their long-term efficiency scale and 
growth declines. 
 
Table 3—Average Growth by Firm Age (1994 - 2009) 
Age Group Growth Workers Growth Sales 
1 — 3 5.87% 81.83% 
4 — 6 1.56% 33.72% 
7 — 9  0.35% 11.13% 
10 — 15  -1.46% 5.23% 
 
 
 The dependent variables used for testing hypotheses 4 to 8 explore discrete events 
derived from entrepreneurial decisions. In hypotheses 4 to 7 the events are the compari-
son between the choices of closure, transfer, and continuation in the management of a 
venture during that year. For hypothesis 8, it is the starting of a new firm on a given year. 
 
Independent Variables.—The explanatory variables of interest operationalise the dimen-
sions of entrepreneurial ability and outsidership introduced in the Survey chapter and 
thereafter additionally detailed during the exposition of the testable hypotheses. Entrepre-
neurial ability, estimated from the wages earned prior to entry in self-employment via a 
high-dimensional fixed-effects method, is sub-divided into 4 categories corresponding to 
the quartile intervals of its distribution. The choice enriches the interpretation of an oth-
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erwise linear effect to correspond to the distinct outcomes verified across the distribution. 
Similarly to the procedure adopted by Stata for the computed fixed-effects estimates, the 
density of entrepreneurial ability has a zero average and a standard deviation of one. The 
estimated fixed-effects included all working population during the period, from which 
only those who became entrepreneurs were sampled, skewing the used ability distribution 
to the left and greatly increasing the standard deviation to 2.56, as depicted on Table 2. 
The following methodology section offers a more detailed explanation of the estimation 
procedure used to obtain this variable. 
Correlations of entrepreneurial ability with other variables show a strong negative 
relationship with necessity entrepreneurship, that is, entrepreneurs whose company closed 
in the two years preceding entry in self-employment, as well as weaker but still negative 
relationship with foreign nationals and firm closure events. Positive correlations are ob-
served with the performance-based dependent variables, notably sales revenues, the like-
lihood of transfer and schooling, which serves as one of the proxies for human capital. 
Adding to the previous remark, the cross-tabulation between the level of school-
ing and the ability of entrepreneurs depicted on Table 5 shows that while for the bottom 
quartile education achievements are distinctively lower, the distributions of schooling in 
the remaining quartiles are relatively homogeneous. This is particularly evident for the 
third and fourth quartiles, which, while maintaining minimal distributional differences in 
comparison with the third quartile, has marginally less college-educated and more middle 
school graduates than the third quartile. 
 Embeddedness is interpreted in terms of physical distance from the location where 
an individual previously worked. Whilst the information concerning the total time spent 
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by an individual in a given geographical milieu is incomplete, the long typically observed 
in the county during the period—an average of over 5 years—and the reduced labour 
mobility of the workforce (Centeno et al., 2008) suggest that the limited observation of 
previous work locations is a serviceable proxy for embeddedness.  
Empirically, the choice was made to measure outsidership rather than embed-
dedness. This was done to provide a simpler interpretation of the explanatory variables, 
namely of the kilometre distance from the location of the last job. Two variables served 
as statistical proxies for the concept of outsidership. First, the kilometre distance between 
the municipalities where the individual was last observed as a paid-employee and where 
he founded a firm. A second variable which named outsidership, accounting for the lack 
of embeddedness, is a dummy equal to one when the municipality where the firm was 
started is either the same, or adjacent to, the municipality where the entrepreneur last 
worked as an employee. The construction of this variable was made possible by the pre-
vious efforts of Catarina Alvarez and Marta Lopes who, working with the IGEO set, 
kindly ceded the data to the author.  
 About one-fifth of new firms are started in a municipality different from, and with 
no borders with, the municipality where the individual was last employed. Of these, about 
35% move into Lisbon and 20% to Porto, the two major urban centres of the country, 
which may reflect that the change is motivated by lack of economic conditions in the 
original location. Correlations between the proxies for outsidership and variables associ-
ated with business longevity and transfer suggest that the lack of familiarity with a new 
environment hamper not only the odds of survival but also the likelihood of finding a 
buyer for the venture. 
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Table 4 —Correlations (1994 - 2009)
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Ability 1.00                
2. Distance (km) 0.01 1.00               
3. Outsider 0.02 0.68 1.00              
4. Schooling 0.13 0.04 0.04 1.00             
5. Age 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00            
6. Prior Exp. 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.06 0.04 1.00           
7. Necessity -0.36 0.00 0.02 -0.15 -0.10 -0.11 1.00          
8. Male 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.07 1.00         
9. Foreign -0.12 0.02 0.16 -0.05 -0.13 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 1.00        
19. No. Work 0.19 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00       
11. Sales Rev. 0.26 -0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.25 1.00      
12. Labour Growth  0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 1.00     
13. Sales Growth 0.15 0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.09 1.00    
14. Firm age 0.09 -0.13 -0.22 0.04 0.27 0.00 -0.31 0.02 -0.17 0.03 0.09 -0.08 -0.30 1.00   
15. Closure -0.12 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.12 0.00 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 1.00  
16. Transfer 0.17 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 1.00 
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Table 5—Distribution of Entrepreneurial Ability by Level of Schooling (1994 — 2009) 
Schooling/Ability P1 — P25 P26 — P50 P51 — P75 P76 — P100 Total 
Primary 31.50% 25.90% 19.50% 17.40% 23.58% 
Middle School 39.40% 40.70% 33.10% 37.00% 37.55% 
High School 22.20% 19.80% 25.60% 24.40% 23.00% 
College 6.90% 13.60% 21.80% 21.20% 15.88% 
 
Controls.—Other explanatory variables commonly used as predictors of firm perfor-
mance served as controls at both micro- and macro-levels. Starting with the former, the 
habitual set of individual socio-demographic characteristics as years of schooling, age, 
gender, and foreign nationality were included. Years of schooling and age serve as 
proxies for the quality of human capital accounting for the investment in formal and on-
the-job training, respectively (Mincer, 1974). After controlling for education, age can 
also serve as a proxy for the existence of liquidity constraints, as individuals tend to 
become wealthier as they become older (Cabral and Mata, 2003).  Both gender and for-
eign nationality are dummy variables that control for potential sexual discrimination by 
clients and other business partners (Becker, 1971; Fischer et al. 1993) and for the liabil-
ity of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). 
 Past self-employment experience was introduced for those who sequentially 
started more than one firm during the period ranging from 1994 to 2009. One caveat of 
this procedure is ignoring those who were worked as entrepreneurs prior to 1985 but 
employed during at least two years the time interval of the 1985 – 1991 sample.  
 Another individual-specific variable controls for necessity entrepreneurship. 
Necessity entrepreneurs are different from opportunity entrepreneurs in that the occupa-
tional choice is motivated by an exogenous factor, namely the lack of paid-employment 
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opportunities (Reynolds et al., 2005). The reduced scope of the alternative-set has im-
plications on the voluntary character of entrepreneurial entry and consequences on the 
earnings obtained in self-employment with necessity entrepreneurs earning 30% less 
than their opportunity counterparts, according to German data (Block and Wagner, 
2010).  
Individuals were coded as necessity entrepreneurs if their last job prior to self-
employment had been terminated by the closure of the firm. The limitation found in the 
criterion used to define this variable—it excludes all involuntary terminations that were 
not the result of discontinuation of business ran by the employer—is due to the inability 
of the QP survey in separating identify voluntary from involuntary contractual termina-
tions. The practical implication of this bias in the analysis is the likely under-estimation 
of the effect of necessity entrepreneurship, as productive and unproductive employees 
are fired when the company closes. Still, I call the attention of the reader for the nega-
tive correlations between necessity entrepreneurship and the variables associated with 
measures of human capital. In particular, the -0.36 coefficient with entrepreneurial abil-
ity signals that those entering by necessity face a significant liability in self-
employment. 
At the level of the firm, model specifications control for a number of perfor-
mance measures. Specifically, lagged firm size, assessed both in term of personnel and 
sales turnover served as controls of current performance and continuation, transfer, or 
closure decisions. On top of that, and due of the longitudinal nature of the data, firm age 
dummies retrieved any cohort-specific determinants of the regressands.  
Finally, 85 two-digit SIC codes control for industry specific factors in all but the 
high-dimensional fixed-effects model. The choice was justified because of model speci-
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fications—firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, a more fine-grained measure, was al-
ready accounted for. Also, year dummies control for other macro factors that identically 




The statistical analysis of the predictions developed in the Hypothesis section consists 
of a set of different methodologies, developed in the text below. The level of exposi-
tional detail will vary according to the novelty and dissemination of each of the meth-
ods. Under this light, the high-dimensional fixed-effects method for the estimation of 
ability is extensively discussed, as well as its particular application in the context of the 
current analysis.  
The testing of hypotheses 1 through 3 uses the ordinary least-squares (OLS) es-
timator with robust standard-errors to correct for potential heteroscedasticity when es-
timating the entry size of the firm and OLS with the Heckman (1979) correction proce-
dure for the sample selection bias when measuring the firm growth.  
Hypotheses 4 through 7 are tested with a multinomial model allowing for the 
evaluation of different possible mutually-exclusive actions taken by the entrepreneur.  
Finally, the predictions linking entrepreneurial ability to specialisation in firm creation, 
as described in hypothesis 8, use a negative binomial model to estimate the number of 
ventures started after the first one.  
 
Estimating Ability.—The definition of entrepreneurial ability presented in the Survey 
chapter relied on a couple of principles: observability through performance and time-
persistence. Entrepreneurial ability is not directly observable by the researcher, but im-
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printed in the performance of managed firms. If a level of ability is specific to an indi-
vidual and traceable through time, then it is possible to exogenously estimate individual 
ability prior to the start of the first self-employment spell. This is done via the examina-
tion of the employment wages earned before entering in entrepreneurship. Individuals, 
as well as their employers, are aware of their own productivity. A given employer will 
thus differentiate between workers with similar socio-demographic characteristics by 
paying a wage premium to the more productive individuals, as wages tend to reflect the 
productivity of labour. If other wage determinants are controlled for and included in a 
wage equation, then the remainder differential in earnings will the ceteris paribus indi-
vidual productivity.  
 Ability is therefore analysed prior to the entry in entrepreneurship. Specifically, 
the chosen measure of ability uses a time-invariant, residual, component of the wage of 
the employee. To produce an unbiased measure of ability, all other relevant wage de-
terminants need to be excluded. For this purpose, wage determinants follow the tradi-
tional Mincer (1974) characterisation and include the controls for education, experience, 
seniority, industry, firm, and—because of the longitudinal composition of the data—
year of observation. The wage regression can then be written as: 
 
(1)                           
 
where,  
      represents the logarithm of the deflated monthly wage of each individual i, 
working form firm f  on year t;  
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        are the observed time-varying characteristics of individual i and firm f  in 
year t: 
 time-varying characteristics of worker i—year of schooling, age, age-squared, 
seniority, and seniority-squared; 
 time-varying characteristics of firm j: log of number of workers and industry; 
    is the individual fixed-effect, here  interpreted as ability; 
    is a firm fixed-effect; 
    are 6 year dummies ranging from 1985 to 1991; 
      is assumed to follow the conventional random error assumptions. 
 
The above wage function is then estimated with a fixed-effects model that ac-
counts for unobserved individual-, firm-, and industry-level heterogeneity. Most statisti-
cal packages resort to sets of dummy variables to absorb any unobserved group-specific 
heterogeneity. This can be better understood if we rewrite equation (1) in matrix nota-
tion so that: 
 
(2)                      
 
where   ,   , and    are the group-dummies for worker, firm, and year, respectively.  
 
High-Dimensional Fixed-Effects: Because of the very large size of    and   , nearly 
3 million workers and over 200,000 firms spanning 7 years of data, the usual least-
squared matrix inversion method of estimation becomes computationally unworkable. 
Instead, I followed the procedure proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) to fit 
-56- 
models with high-dimensional fixed-effects. The procedure, implemented in Stata via 
the reg2hdfe command, applies the full Gauss-Seidel, or zigzag, method as proposed 
by Smyth (1996), which produces a stable but slow iteration depending on the correla-
tion between the parameter estimators. The application of an iterative algorithm as the 
zigzag method to solve normal equations is highly inefficient when compared to the 
closed-form least-square approach. However, this implementation has the advantage of 
not requiring the explicit calculation of the inverse of the X′X matrix.  
Following the method proposed by Guimarães and Portugal derive the first-
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The above partition of the normal equations benefits from a convenient iteration 
strategy. To obtain the exact least-squares solution, one can simply alternate between 
estimation of β, λ, θ, and α. The expressions (  
   )
     , (  
   )
      and  
(  
   )
       used on the estimation of λ, θ, and α respectively, translate into simple 
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group averages of the fixed-effects of the regression of Y on X. When the estimation 
procedure converges, the coefficients on     ,     and     must both equal one and 
the vectors    ,    , and     will contain all the estimated coefficients for the group-
dummy variables. With this approach, it is possible to avoid the inversion of a very 
large matrix that would be required if we had simply added    and   ,    has smaller 
dimensions, to the set of regressors.  
 
Estimating Firm Performance.—Firm performance is defined as the natural logarithms 
of initial size in terms of personnel and turnover and yearly the rate of growth of these 
variables.  The estimation of initial size used an OLS regression with robust standard 
errors, following the correction proposed by White (1980), to account for probable het-
eroscedasticity in the disturbance term, which could affect inference power. 
 The estimation of the rates of firm growth needs some additional treatment to 
ensure the precision of its estimates. Unlike for entry size, the data concerning growth 
rates suffers from a survival bias. This problem is potentially the most serious for young 
firms that have high exit rates (Evans, 1987b).  The widely implemented correction pro-
cedure suggested Heckman (1979) solves the issues created by the selection bias with a 
two-step estimator. The first step deals with the selection issue by estimating a probit 
model for the determinants of firm closure. The inverse Mills ratio from the probit mod-
el is then fitted along with the other covariates into an OLS regression for firm growth. 




Heckman Correction: More formally, we have a behavioural equation describing the 
determinants of firm growth for the firms in which growth information is observed—the 
survivors—and a selection equation—what determines firm closure: 
 
(5)         
        
(6)       (   
          )   
 
Note that we only observe     when       . If the error terms are normally dis-
tributed with zero mean and one standard-deviation but correlated amongst themselves 
in the sense that the unconditional mean of u1 is different from its expectation condi-
tional on v2: 
 
(7)  (  |  )       
 
The general model for an interior solution, conditional on the survival of the 
firm can be expressed as: 
  
(8)  (   |   
        )     
      (   
  ) 
 
with   (   
  ) being a term that represents the correlation between the two errors and 
defined as: 
 
(9)  (     )   (   |         
  )    
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With a normality assumption  (     ) may be estimated via a probit model as 
the inverse Mills ratio meaning that 
 
(10)  (     )  
 (   
  )




The Heckman correction procedure first estimates equation (6) with a probit 
from which (9) is then computed as an inverse Mills ratio to be included as a regressor 
on (5) in order to account for the firm selection bias. 
 
Firm Continuance, Transfer, or Closure.—The distinction between alternative fates for 
a venture may be interpreted as a discrete choice problem in which the outcomes in eve-
ry given period may be the continuing of operations under the same entrepreneur, which 
will serve as the baseline category, the closure of the venture motivated by the exit of 
the entrepreneur, or the transfer of the venture to another individual. Observing the fre-
quencies of each event we have a total of 188,169 continuations, 17,964 exits by clo-
sure, and 2,715 exits by transfer, values that are consistent with those found in previous 
studies of managerial turnover (Holmes and Schmitz, 1996).  
When considering how the choice of transfer or closure affects the likelihood of 
continuation on a given period one needs to acknowledge the theoretical differences in 
the determination of each outcome. Specifically, entrepreneurial ability may increase 
the probabilities of transfer and closure vis-à-vis the baseline. This may occur if the 
effect of opportunity cost opportunity cost present on entrepreneurial ability dominates 
the quality, or lack of, of management effect also included on the variable. Since the 
effects are expected to differ across the two alternatives, the reduction of three alterna-
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tives to a set of pairwise comparisons performed by the multinomial logit model incurs 
the risk of creating biased estimates. 
 
New Firm, Existing Firm, or Paid-Employment.—The final proposed hypothesis assess-
es whether there is specialisation into different activities across entrepreneurs. This is 
done by observing occupational choices occurring after the exit from an on-going entre-
preneurial venture. The founding of a new firm, management of an existing firm, and 
the return to paid-employment were the three occupational alternatives taken into ac-
count, with the latter being the baseline category. Whilst self- and paid-employment 
occupational choices are intrinsically different in terms of associated risk and conse-
quent expected return (Coase, 1937), the disaggregation of self-employment into crea-
tion and business development activities and management of already existing firms 
needs to be further justified. Business founding and initial development requires a dif-
ferent set of skills to those associated with the management of existing organisations. 
Specifically, founders have a more active role in the identification of potentially profit-
able business opportunities (Venkataraman, 1997) and imprinting their traits into the 
organisation (Geroski et al., 2010). 
Finally, as with the prior set of alternatives—continuance, transfer, or exit—
effects are expected to vary as different pair of alternatives are compared to each other, 
so a MNP methodology described below was implemented. 
 
Multinomial Probit Model: The situations portrayed in the paragraphs above both 
combine a discrete choice problem with a panel data structure. Given that setting, the 
MNP estimator is a known suitable alternative for the estimation of such models for 
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couple of reasons.  First, the MNP allows for the introduction of correlation across 
choices in the unobserved component by utilising normally distributed errors (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005). Albeit more computer-intensive to estimate than other multinomial 
models, a two-fold integral needs to be calculated, the MNP method guarantees that any 
unobserved correlation between outcomes, namely between transfers and closures, is 
accounted for. In the case of 3-alternatives model probabilities are evaluated by: 
 
            (  )       (   ) ∫ ∫  ( ̃    ̃  )  ̃    ̃  
  ̃  
  




where  ( ̃    ̃  ) is a bivariate normal with two free covariance parameters and  ̃   and 
 ̃   depend on regressors and parameters β. 
Secondly, the multinomial probit (MNP) model avoids the potential drawbacks 
from the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) present in other multinomial 
models, notably the multinomial logit model (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).  One 
limitation of such models is that the discrimination among the m alternatives reduces to 
a series of pairwise comparisons that are unaffected by the characteristics of alternatives 





The present chapter presents the estimation results for the models previously described 
in the Methods and Data chapter. Seven empirical models, each with a set of different 
specifications, tested the hypotheses on the data constructed from the combination of 
the QP and the IGEO sets. Results are contextualised by the theoretical predictions and 
within the range of earlier findings in the literature. 
 
A. Prior Productivity as Worker 
 The first model estimates a wage regression for the periods ranging from 1985 
to 1991 with the purpose of retrieving the proxy for entrepreneurial ability from its in-
dividual fixe-effect component. The second and third are OLS estimations of the entry 
size of new ventures, measured by number of employees and sales revenues. The fourth 
and fifth models introduce firm growth as dependent variable in order to understand the 
impact of entrepreneurial ability and embeddedness on a dynamic setting. The OLS 
estimation of the firm growth models uses the Heckman (1979) procedure to correct any 
potential issues rising from a survival bias. 
 Hypotheses 4 through 7 are evaluated via a MNP model with firm continuation, 
transfer, and closure being used as the alternatives. The section is concluded with an-
other MNP regression that explores the different occupational choices of those who 
exited a previously managed venture. The alternatives in this case are paid-employment, 
the starting of a new firm, and the management of already existing venture. 
 
Estimating Entrepreneurial Ability.—The variable entrepreneurial ability is a construc-
tion based on the wages earned by employees prior to the start of the first self-
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employment spell. It is therefore necessary that the estimation of entrepreneurial ability 
occurs before that of the remaining empirical models. During the 1985 – 1991 time in-
terval, the wages of nearly 3 million workers with at least two consecutive years of in-
formation were regressed on the traditional Mincerian determinants via a high-
dimensional fixed-effects model.  
 
     Table 6—High-Dimensional Fixed-Effects Wage Regression (1985 — 1991) 






ln(no. Workers) 0.071*** 
Firm Age Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
R-squared 0.687 
Observations  8,489,053 
Individuals  2,871,053 
Firms 207,259 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The small magnitude of the coefficients relative to those yielded by conventional 
pooled OLS models can be explained by the nature of the estimation method (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005). The presence of one or more omitted variables which account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the data leads to a model with biased estimates and over- 
or underestimation issues. As I expected entrepreneurial ability to be correlated with 
other observable measures of human capital, the inclusion of a fixed-effect that captures 
should reduce the weight of the contributions of other worker-specific regressors on the 
expected wage. In fact, coefficients for schooling, age, and tenure are similar to other 
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fixed-effects estimations performed on the QP survey by Martins (2008). The slight 
difference in results in our data can be accounted for with the different time frame se-
lected and by the inclusion of firm-specific fixed effects in the present model. A closer 
approximation to the chosen methodology to the data from the QP survey, albeit for 
more aggregate purposes, is present in Carneiro et al. (2012). 
Asides from the specificities of the estimation method, the estimation results 
from Table 6 portray a number of well-established empirical relationships in labour 
economics. The observed returns to schooling represent the human capital investments 
prior to entry in the labour market (Mincer, 1974), while returns to experience, meas-
ured as age and quadratic age, and tenure account for the returns of general and firm-
specific human capital investments (Becker, 1962). 
 
B. Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures 
Hypotheses one through 3 established a theoretical link between entrepreneurial ability 
and embeddedness and the performance of new ventures, measured in terms of initial 
size and rate of growth. As mentioned, both number of employees and sales revenues 
serve as proxies for firm size, which further validates and increases the robustness of the 
findings. Each empirical model has 3 specifications. The first specification is a bench-
mark model and uses traditional socio-demographic variables as proxies for entrepre-
neurial ability. The second specification studies the impact of ability, in quartiles, and 
lack of embeddedness, the kilometre distance to the prior municipality, on firm perfor-
mance, as predicted on hypotheses 1 and 2. The third specification tests for the mediat-
ing role of embeddedness on ability. The lack of embeddedness, described as outsid-
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ership, is a dummy equal to one if the prior municipality of the entrepreneur is not the 
current one, or adjacent to the current one.  
Finally, some notes regarding model specifications. The bottom ability quartile 
is the omitted baseline category and that the reported distance coefficients are multi-
plied by 10. All model specifications include 85 industry dummies and year dummies 
for the 1994 – 2009 period of analysis. Firm size at entry is the natural logarithm of 
initial the number of workers or sales turnover, so OLS coefficients are semi-
elasticities. The rate of growth is the yearly difference between the natural logarithm of 
firm size. 
Table 7 describes the determinants of the entry size of a new venture. Columns 
(1) and (4) serve as the benchmark model that contrasts with the remaining specifica-
tions. Using this set of predictors we can observe a positive relation between human 
capital in terms of years of schooling and experience and the initial size of the company. 
This relationship persists in other model specifications, but with a smaller coefficient 
for schooling. Both necessity and foreign entrepreneurs face important liabilities when 
starting a venture whilst prior entrepreneurial experience is an important determinant of 
entry size, particularly when measured in terms of personnel.  
Results support the first hypothesis with entrepreneurial ability, defined as the 
wage premium commanded as wageworker, predicting larger entry size. Columns (2) 
and (5) explicit this relationship, with those in the upper ability quartile starting firms 
approximately 30% larger than those at the bottom 25% of the entrepreneurial popula-
tion. 
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 DV = ln(Initial no. Work) DV = ln(Initial Sales Rev.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.918*** 0.968*** 0.977*** 3.468*** 3.556*** 3.530*** 
Ability:       
Q2  0.013*** 0.023***  0.104*** 0.128*** 
Q3  0.074*** 0.097***  0.160*** 0.207*** 
Q4  0.276*** 0.218***  0.330*** 0.294*** 
Distance (km) × 10  -0.029***   -0.071***  
Outsider   -0.103***   -0.092*** 
Outsider × Ability:       
Outsider × Ability Q2   -0.031***   -0.083** 
Outsider × Ability Q3   -0.065***   -0.149*** 
Outsider × Ability Q4   0.158***   0.078* 
Schooling 0.032*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
Age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.002* 
Prior Venture 0.304*** 0.301*** 0.300*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 
Necessity -0.125*** -0.109** -0.120** -0.240*** -0.235*** -0.233*** 
Male 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.226*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 
Foreign -0.180** -0.184** -0.191** -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.145*** 
2-digit SIC Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 207,656 207,656 207,656 207,656 207,656 207,656 
Adj. R-squared 0.278 0.280 0.291 0.394 0.395 0.395 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Differences in coefficients are larger for the sales revenues of the first year of 
activity, depicted on columns (5) and (6), but nonetheless significant for both measures 
of firm size. The gap registered for the upper ability quartile—it more than doubles the 
coefficient from the third quartile—is of particular interest, especially given that the 
differences in education are not very pronounced between these two quartiles, see Table 
5. The aforementioned argument that relatively high-ability/low-schooling individuals 
self-select themselves into entrepreneurship is consistent with this finding.   
Larger distances between the locations of the last establishment where the indi-
vidual worked and that of the started venture reduce initial. Also, from columns (3) and 
(6), outsiders coming from a municipality other than the present one, or one adjacent to 
the present one, will open ventures that are about 10% smaller vis-à-vis those of local 
rivals. These results support the prediction of hypothesis 2a, which theorised that a posi-
tive impact of structural embeddedness on firm performance was explained by the fa-
miliarity of locals with their milieu. Outsiders, by contrast, have to incur into transac-
tion and reputational costs, which puts them, at least initially, in a less advantageous 
position. 
Hypothesis 3, relating the positive mediating impact of structural embeddedness 
on ability and, subsequently, on firm performance, demands a more fine-grained analy-
sis of results. Examining the coefficients from columns (3) and (6) of Table 7 we see 
that, in general, outsiders start firms that are about 10% smaller than locals. The nega-
tive signal of the slopes for the interaction of the second and third quartiles with outsid-
ership demonstrates the difference between the comparable quartiles of lower. On aver-
age, outsiders on the second and third ability quartiles start smaller firms than their 
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comparable local counterparts. This result is consistent with hypothesis 3, which pre-
dicted that the amplifying role of embeddedness on entrepreneurial ability.  
The same cannot be said, however, of the interaction between outsidership and 
the fourth ability quartile. Outsiders in this group start larger firms than local entrepre-
neurs belonging to the same interval of the ability distribution. As was noted before, 
entry in an unfamiliar environment carries transactional and other costs to outsiders who 
need to costly acquire and convey information for market insiders. Serving as a de facto 
entry barrier, this liability of outsidership is expected to reduce and hamper the start of 
new ventures by outsiders. As a consequence, a disproportionate number of outsiders 
should be found amongst the high-ability ranks of entrants. This conjecture is confirmed 
by the distribution of ability according to local of origin of the entrepreneur depicted on 
Table 8. Consistent, the distribution of locals, accounting for approximately one-fifth of 
individuals, shows a small monotonic decrease in the weights of each quartile as ability 
increases. By contrast, over 35% of outsiders are in the top quartile, which can help to 
explain the signal of the interaction effects reported above. 
 
Table 8—Ability/Outsider Cross-Tabulation (1994 - 2009) 
      Ability               Locals             Outsiders 
P1 — P25 27.35% 13.65% 
  P26 — P50 26.43% 19.27% 
  P51 — P75 23.59% 30.61% 
    P76 — P100 22.63% 36.47% 
 
Continuing with the analysis of new venture performance we now move the firm 
growth estimates. Firm growth, defined as the yearly difference in the natural loga-
rithms of size, shares most of its individual-level determinants with firm size so results 
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are not expected to drastically differ from those of Table 7. As discussed in the method-
ological discussion of the previous chapter, the study of firm growth suffered from a 
survival bias. The problem was solved with the implementation of Heckman‘s (1979) 
two-step correcting procedure. The first step, transcribed on Table 9 consists of a probit 
model to estimate the likelihood of firm closure, the selection event.   
The determinants of firm closure are evaluated at entry and are similar in signal 
and significance to those of the later MNP models from Table 11. The inverse Mills 
ratio retrieved from Table 9 is included as a regression term on the firm growth regres-
sions as a correction for the survival bias derived from growth being conditional on the 
continuation of the venture. The lack of significance in this term evidences the relative-
ly small magnitude of the bias that would be incurred should growth be measured with-
out a correction for survival. 
 
Table 9—Probit Self-Selection Model (1994 – 2009) 
DV = Closure Coefs. 
Constant -221.244*** 
At Entry:  
     Ability -0.173*** 
     Distance (km) × 10 0.023** 
     Schooling -0.064*** 
     Age -0.012*** 
     Prior Venture 0.077*** 
     Necessity 0.418*** 
     Male -0.069*** 
     Foreign 1.204*** 
     ln(No. worker) -0.249** 
Firm Age YES 
2-digit SIC Controls YES 
Year Controls YES 
Observations 245,580 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 retains the specifications of the initial firm size models, with further controls 
for growth, notably the aforementioned inverse Mills ratio from the selection model, 
firm age, and initial size. Concerning firm age and initial size, older firms grow less 
than younger ones and larger organisations tend to experience milder variations in size 
than their smaller counterparts. Therefore, the negative relationships between both age 
and firm size and the rate of growth fall in line with past findings in the literature (Ev-
ans, 1987b). 
The most noticeable difference between the size and the growth models lies in 
the signal of the coefficients for the age of the entrepreneur. Whilst relatively small in 
magnitude, the pattern extends to all the model specifications tested on Table 10. Other 
than that, outcomes validate the aforementioned remarks with firms managed by the 
consecutively higher ability entrepreneurs growing faster than those of their less apt 
counterparts. Similarities are also found in the distance coefficients, with entrepreneurs 
coming from distances further away suffering from lower rates of growth.  In regard to 
the ability/embeddedness interactions, similar, although less significant, outcomes per-
sist. In terms of turnover, the top 25% of outsider entrepreneurs grew almost 40% faster 
vis-à-vis locals. As in the case of initial firm size, the remaining quartiles of entrepre-
neurs coming from municipalities other than the current or an adjacent one, experience 
weaker rates of growth than locals. 
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Table 10—Firm Growth OLS Estimates (1994 - 2009
 DV = No. Work. Growth DV = Sales Rev. Growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.097*** -0.052* -0.053** -4.826*** -4.030*** -4.197*** 
Ability:       
Q2  0.001* 0.001*  0.029** 0.052** 
Q3  0.032* 0.023**  0.061* 0.097* 
Q4  0.091*** 0.086***  0.275*** 0.151*** 
Distance (km) × 10  -0.026**   -0.001***  
Outsider   -0.087***   -0.041 
Outsider × Ability       
Outsider × Ability Q2   -0.002   -0.089 
Outsider × Ability Q3   -0.010*   -0.087* 
Outsider × Ability Q4   0.144**   0.383** 
Schooling 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
Prior Venture 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.063** 0.064** 0.063** 
Necessity -0.013** -0.014* -0.013* -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
Male 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.065*** 
Foreign -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.075* -0.075 -0.075 
ln(Size t-1) -0.150*** -0.147*** -0.112*** -0.311*** -0.317*** -0.314*** 
ln(Sales Rev.  t-1) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.599*** -0.592*** -0.592*** 
Firm Age Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-digit SIC Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Inv. Mills Ratio -0.105 -0.097 -0.101 -2.941 -2.332 -2.317 
Observations 142,071 142,071 142,071 142,071 142,071 142,071 
Wald Chi-squared 882.25 901.69 899.80 34,794.70 34,799.72 34,796.24 
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C. Decision to Continue, Transfer, or Close 
Table 11 presents the estimates of the multinomial probit model for the business deci-
sions to keep, transfer, or close a venture in a given year. Hypotheses 4 to 7 identified a 
number of theoretical connections between these three organisational outcomes and the 
explanatory variables of interest—entrepreneurial ability and structural embeddedness.   
The baseline category against which coefficients are compared is the continuation of the 
firm under the same management. The two modes of exit of the entrepreneur comprise 
the transfer of the control of the firm to another individual or the business closure. Re-
sults from column (1) serve the double purpose of providing a benchmark against the 
other specifications and a comparison term with an earlier model used by Holmes and 
Schmitz (1996) in a similar evaluation of the determinants of managerial turnover. Re-
garding this manner, it should be emphasised that differences exist between the MNP 
methodology of Table 11 and the multinomial logit chosen by the authors. The Method-
ology section offers a description of the superior inference qualities of the MNP in 
comparison to other unordered multi-response models. 
 The estimation results from column (1) of Table 11 show the years of schooling 
of the entrepreneur have a negative impact on the likelihood of discontinuation and a 
non-significant positive impact on the probability of business transfer. This result holds 
for the remaining tested specifications. Measures of formal education such as years of 
schooling measure human capital aspects that are not acquired via work nor obtained 
from previous entrepreneurial experience and were included to serve as alternative 
proxies for ability.  
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Table 11—Multinomial Probit Estimates (1994 - 2009) 
 
 
Baseline = Continue (1) (2) (3) 
 Closure Transfer Closure Transfer Closure Transfer 
Constant -332.923*** 32.931*** -312.410*** 25.201*** -312.581*** 25.099*** 
Ability       
Q2   -0.057*** 0.080*** -0.051*** 0.046** 
Q3   -0.046*** 0.092*** -0.028** 0.069* 
Q4   0.078* 0.124*** 0.080** 0.095** 
Distance (km) × 10   0.083*** -0.02***   
Outsider     0.503*** -0.384** 
Outsider × Ability       
Outsider × Ability Q2     0.020 -0.047 
Outsider × Ability Q3     0.050** -0.182*** 
Outsider × Ability Q4     0.065 -0.219 
Schooling -0.044*** 0.005 -0.009*** 4.84e-05 -0.008*** 0.002 
Age -0.008*** -0.003* -0.005** 0.003** -0.002 0.002* 
Prior Venture 0.096*** 0.033* 0.064*** 0.032* 0.079*** 0.044* 
Necessity 0.145*** -0.391* 0.174*** -0.207*** 0.130*** -0.142*** 
Male 0.061*** 0.065** -0.106*** 0.0593** -0.093*** 0.047** 
Foreign 2.109*** 1.424*** 1.871*** 1.279*** 1.991*** 1.341*** 
ln(Workers) -0.053*** 0.042*** -0.059*** 0.048*** -0.058*** 0.051*** 
ln(Sales Rev.) -0.094*** 0.061*** -0.103*** 0.068*** -0.110*** 0.072*** 
Firm Age Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-digit SIC Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 207,656 207,656 207,656 207,656 207,656 207,656 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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The negative impact of the variable on the likelihood of discontinuation can thus 
be understood as a human capital effect with firms controlled by more educated entre-
preneurs being of better quality and thus less likely to fail. Also, and albeit lacking the 
power to perform statistical inference, a positive impact of schooling on the probability 
of transfer is consistent with both a business quality perspective and an opportunity cost 
explanation.  
The coefficients for the age of the entrepreneur are negative for the likelihoods 
of closure and transfer, a result similar to the previous findings of Holmes and Schmitz 
(1996). The signal and magnitude of the impact of age on the probability of closure de-
pends on the different phenomena captured by this variable. In labour economics litera-
ture, age often serves as a proxy for general work experience. For firm owners, age can 
also encapsulate an aspect of the financing constraints that younger, less wealthy entre-
preneurs need to overcome. Finally, the probability of business closure, but also of 
business transfer, tends to surge as individuals age and become increasingly likely to 
retire from the workforce. Whilst the latter effect does not seem to carry much weight in 
for the closure coefficients, results on columns (2) and (3) are consistent with a retire-
ment explanation. 
 Entrepreneurs with prior experience in self-employment are more prone to close 
and, although to a lesser extent, to transfer a business, a result that hints at the proposi-
tion forwarded by hypothesis 8, connecting ability and specialisation into entrepreneur-
ship. Albeit in a different context, and with one more alternative—business transfer—
this result contrasts with the findings of Dahl and Reichstein (2007) on Danish data.  
Likewise, firms started by necessity entrepreneurs also face greater odds of failure 
whilst, being less likely to be transferred. The scale of the negative transfer coefficient 
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demonstrate that, for necessity entrepreneurs, the occupational choice for self-
employment is more of a last resort rather than one amongst a wide set of alternatives. 
 Entrepreneurial ability is a strong predictor of business transfers with the odds of 
transfer becoming gradually larger as the ability distribution moves to the right.  Evalu-
ating each of the other independent variables at its mean, the predicted probability of 
transfer for a firm managed by an entrepreneur in the fourth quartile is of 20.5%, which 
compares to a probability of 9.3% for entrepreneurs in the third quartile. Probabilities of 
closure show a more complex pattern with U-shaped pattern describing the coefficients. 
In other words, outcomes show that closure is more likely for the least and for the most 
apt entrepreneurs, albeit for distinct theoretical reasons. The fact that those at the bottom 
of the ability distribution are more likely to fail is unsurprising, as the performance of 
firms created and managed by this group is known from Table 7 and Table 10 to be 
subpar. For entrepreneurs in the upper quartile of the ability distribution, which control 
better performing ventures, the explanation differs. If, on the one hand, higher ability 
leads to superior business quality, on the other hand, higher ability also means more 
plentiful and better concurring alternatives. An entrepreneur contemplating an apparent-
ly superior alternative in self- or paid-employment will first attempt to sell her current 
venture, but ultimately be willing to discontinue it altogether. In this case the cause of 
closure is the high opportunity cost rather than the poor performance of the venture. 
That is to say that the business fundamentals are solid enough to guarantee its continua-
tion but not attractive enough to generate demand. Should the returns from the continua-
tion be insufficient to compensate the expected returns from the best alternative, then 
closure becomes the likely fate. In short, model outcomes are consistent with the predic-
tions contained in hypotheses 4 and 5b. 
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 A greater distance from past jobs contributes to the probability of business fail-
ure whilst reducing the chances of a transfer occurring. Kilometre distances serve as a 
proxy for embeddedness with individuals starting a business farther away from their 
past location being less familiar with a given environment than locals are. Hypotheses 6 
and 7 tested for the effects of embeddedness on the probabilities of transfer and closure, 
respectively. The findings suggest that it is more difficult for outsiders to find buyers 
for their businesses and more likely for those businesses to fail, even when the quality 
of the businesses is high, as depicted in the interaction results from column (3) of Table 
11.   
 
D. Entrepreneurial Specialisation 
Entrepreneurial specialisation concerns activities pursued by entrepreneurs after the 
leaving of a venture and is evaluated in two forms. First, through an exploratory analy-
sis of the occupations engaged upon after departure from a firm. Second, via an empiri-
cal MNP model that observes the destinations in terms of occupations of those who left 
their first venture via transfer or closure. The goal of the analysis is the testing of hy-
pothesis 8, which relates the individual ability with behaviours reflecting specialisation 
into entrepreneurial activities. 
Table 12 tabulates the occupations of individuals in the after year after, or the 
second year after for the cases in which the first year is missing, departing from their 
prior entrepreneurial venture.  An overall look at the tabulation shows that a larger por-
tion of entrepreneurs who return to self-employment do so after transferring, instead of 
closing, their previous venture. Also, there is a higher portion of missing values after 
two years for closure than for transfer, which can be associated to a possible retirement 
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from the workforce after closing the firm. This is particularly visible when looking at 
missing individuals who were at least 65 when leaving. 
 
Table 12—Cross-Tabulation of Occupation After Departure (1994 — 2009) 
New occupation Transfer Closure 
Entrepreneur 60.89% 60.91% 
New Firm 50.35% 13.95% 
Existing Firm 10.54% 46.96% 
Paid-Worker 36.14% 31.24% 
Missing 2.97% 7.85% 
(Age > 64) 2.35% 3.92% 
Observations 2,715 17,964 
 
The portion of former entrepreneurs remaining in self-employment after trans-
ferring or discontinuing a business is virtually identical. Still, a decomposition of this 
category into whether the managed entrepreneurial firm was founded by the individual 
or was already in place when the entrepreneur took control reveals a sharp distinction 
between the two groups. Over 50% of individuals who remained in entrepreneurship 
after transferring their last business started a new firm, which compares to about 14% of 
those who exited by discontinuation. This difference is consistent with the idea that spe-
cialisation into firm creation and development for subsequent transfer is favoured by 
those with higher levels of ability, whilst the management of existing firms is left for 
lesser apt entrepreneurs (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990).  
Further evidence of the specialisation into serial entrepreneurship is present on 
Table 13. The model estimates the likelihoods of three different choices of occupation 
for those who left a previously controlled venture conditional on a number of individu-
al-level characteristics, notably entrepreneurial ability. As mentioned in the Methodolo-
gy section, the alternatives include the return to paid-employment, which is the baseline 
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category, the founding of a new firm, and the management of an already existing organ-
isation. Over 90% of those who left their venture were identified in the subsequent 5 
years and thus were included in the estimation of the model.  
The results from column (2) of Table 13 demonstrate a positive relationship be-
tween ability and entrepreneurial re-entry via the founding of a new venture. Entrepre-
neurs in the highest ability quartile are the most likely to follow the path of serial entre-
preneurship, whilst those in the second quartile also have a similar probability of doing 
so. Results for the third quartile, albeit positive and statistically significant, are of a 
smaller magnitude. When compared to the second and fourth ability quartiles, the odds 
of these individuals starting another venture are somewhat mitigated by the likelihood 
of the baseline alternative, that is, returning to the paid-labour market. 
By contrast, the probability of reappearing as the manager of a previously exist-
ing firm are only distinct to those of returning to paid-employment for the upper ability 
quartile. Results for all other quartiles are not significantly different from those of the 
baseline. This shows that, although the ownership and management of an already exist-
ing firm may be seen as a form of entrepreneurial activity, those using this re-entering 
choice are closer in terms of ability to paid-workers than to entrepreneurs who return by 
founding a new venture. Theoretically, the result can be explained by the predictions of 
hypothesis 8, as individuals with higher endowments of ability benefit from a speciali-
sation into serial entrepreneurship. This occurs because the demand for businesses is 
dependent on its intrinsic quality. As shown on the results regarding hypothesis 1, abil-
ity is a predictor of business quality, so it follows that a greater of ability should lead to 




Table 13—Multinomial Probit Re-Entry Estimates (1994 — 2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline = Paid-Employment New Firm Existing Firm New Firm Existing Firm New Firm Existing Firm 
Constant 102.144 -65.921 124.391 -60.507 138.877 -58.956 
Ability:       
            Q2   0.234*** -0.034   
            Q3   0.147* 0.018           
            Q4   0.262*** 0.056*   
Ability (Linear)     0.217*** 0.053** 
Prior Exit by Transfer 1.793*** 1.219*** 0.935*** 0.661** 1.293*** 0.735** 
Transfer × Ability:       
            Transfer × Ability Q2   -0.273 0.037   
            Transfer × Ability Q3   0.085 0.004   
            Transfer × Ability Q4   0.208** 0.026   
Transfer× Ability (Linear)     0.148** 0.042 
Schooling -0.029 0.138* -0.021** 0.073 -0.010* 0.038* 
Age -0.108*** 0.264** -0.115* -0.210* -0.139*** -0.174 
Male 0.073 0.093** 0.049 0.042** 0.054 0.041** 
Foreign 0.113** -0.253*** 0.115** -0.263*** 0.144** -0.293*** 
Years after exit Controls YES YES YES 
2-digit SIC Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 18,938 18,938 18,938 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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As evidenced in the descriptive analysis of Table 12, the mode of exit from the 
previous venture matters for the occupational choice in re-entry. Prior exit by transfer—
in contrast to exit by closure—increases the chances of re-entry in entrepreneurship 
when compared to the paid-employment alternative. Still, the size of the effects is high-
ly dependent on the mode of return, with the transfer of an anterior venture having a 
greater impact on the likelihood of founding a new firm than it does on the probability 
of managing an existing business. This result can be explained with the entrepreneurial 
specialisation notion, according to which, entrepreneurs transfer existing firms in order 
to start new ones that allow them the pursuit of previously unavailable opportunities. By 
contrast, exit by business discontinuation, the omitted category, is significantly different 
from the two categories of re-entry via the entrepreneurship route. A possible justifica-
tion may be related to an opportunity cost explanation, with entrepreneurs discontinuing 
their business in order to return to a better-paying job as an employee.  
The coefficients for the years of schooling should be interpreted under the light 
of the results obtained for entrepreneurial ability. More formal education reduces the 
chances of re-entering by start-up whilst only having a small, marginally significant, 
impact on the odds of running an established firm. This sharply contrasts with the re-
sults for the entrepreneurial ability dummies, which increase the odds of returning to 
self-employment as a founder of a new firm. A possible explanation for this observation 
is linked with the signalling effect of formal education in paid-employment (Spence, 
1973). If firms use schooling as a criterion for assessing human capital, then more edu-
cated entrepreneurs will have an advantage over otherwise similar peers when applying 
for jobs after leaving self-employment. Formal education constitutes a particularly valu-
able source of information regarding the quality of the human capital when information 
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asymmetries regarding the fate of the previously managed business exist. By contrast, 
this information, and the signalling associated to schooling is of no value for an individ-
ual who returns to self-employment. Within this subgroup, a fewer proportion of indi-
viduals graduated from college and from high school, as demonstrated on the disaggre-
gation provided on Table 14. The almost negligible difference in the college degree 
category between those re-entering into an existing firm and the individuals returning to 
paid-employment further confirms the schooling coefficients from Table 13. 
 
Table 14—Cross-Tabulation of Schooling/Mode of Re-Entry (1994 — 2009) 
 New Firm Existing Firm Paid-Worker Total 
Primary 20.38% 14.06% 16.45% 16.96% 
Middle School 34.61% 31.73% 26.15% 30.83% 
High School 29.17% 31.72% 34.47% 31.79% 
College 15.84% 22.49% 22.93% 20.42% 
 
Older entrepreneurs are less likely to start another company after leaving the 
previous one. The coefficient for age is likely to carry a retirement effect, as the creation 
of a new firm is a lengthier process than the acceptance of a paid-employment job in an 
existing firm. Foreigners, however, are more likely to open than to revert to a worker 











The central theme of the present dissertation was that employment experiences taking 
place prior to entrepreneurship play a determinant part in the prediction of individual 
and venture outcomes in self-employment. Using a set of statistical models to data on 
more than 36,000 Portuguese start-ups over the 1994 – 2009 period I found that factors 
such as worker productivity and the prior embeddedness in an environment had a lasting 
impact on later actions ranging from occupational choice to keep or transfer decisions. 
What is more, the two factors influence each other with embeddedness serving as a 
catalyst for the ability of the entrepreneur.  
Specifically, entrepreneurial ability, defined as the individual fixed-effect of 
work wages earned prior to entry in self-employment, predicted entry size and growth 
with ventures founded by entrepreneurs with higher levels of ability being larger at en-
try and growing at a faster pace than those started under comparable conditions by oth-
erwise similar individuals. In addition to this, entrepreneurial ability had an incremental 
impact on the probability of firm closure and an also positive, yet greater in magnitude, 
effect on the likelihood of business transfer. This seemingly paradoxical result—
entrepreneurial ability causes firms to perform better but also to experience shorter lon-
gevities—was attributed to an opportunity cost effect. Ability, being constructed from a 
wage equation, also accounts for the opportunity cost of the individual. Consequently, 
entrepreneurs with greater levels of ability benefit from improved prospects concerning 
employment alternatives and thus were more likely to abandon a venture by discontinu-
ance, but especially via transfer. Whilst the former mode of exit may motivated by the 
relatively low earnings of self-employment compared to the equivalent paid-labour 
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wages (Hamilton, 2000), the latter is consistent with a cash-out approach (Arora and 
Nandkumar, 2011) according to which more apt entrepreneurs who create better per-
forming businesses have improved prospects of finding a buyer to take over the venture. 
Occupational choice observed after departure from a start-up is also conditional 
on individual ability. A statistically significant, monotonic, relationship between entre-
preneurial ability categories and the likelihood of re-entry in entrepreneurship via the 
founding of a new firm was found to hold. When compared to those who revert back 
from entrepreneurship to paid-employment, or those who, whilst remaining entrepre-
neurs, turn into owner-managers of existing ventures, serial entrepreneurs were more 
likely to have transferred, rather than discontinued their previous venture. This is con-
sistent with a division of labour hypothesis theorised by Holmes and Schmitz (1990), in 
which the highest ability entrepreneurs specialise in the creation and development of 
businesses and thus becoming serial entrepreneurs. 
Structural Embeddedness, measured as the physical distance between the loca-
tions where an individual worked and that where he subsequently starts a firm, pro-
duced an impact on the initial size and growth rates of entrepreneurial ventures, whilst 
also mediating the effect of ability on performance. Longer distances translated into a 
more significant liability for the outsider entrepreneur and firms created by this group 
were smaller and lagged in growth vis-à-vis their local counterparts. Past research dis-
cussing the implications on performance of the reputational (Granovetter, 1985) and 
transaction (Uzzi, 1999) costs aspects for unembedded actors further substantiates these 
findings.  
More generally, the embeddedness/performance interplay may be interpreted 
under the light of a risk/reward analysis. On the one hand, unembedded entrants lack 
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familiarity and hence social ties with other actors in a network (Granovetter, 1973). This 
may explain why outsiders were more likely to close and less likely to transfer a ven-
ture. On the other hand, moving into a new location constitutes a de facto strategic 
commitment, and can improve business prospects by expanding the potential customer 
base—particularly when moving to larger urban areas—and by introducing an innova-
tion capable of generating a competitive advantage over rivals (Uzzi, 1997). Evidence 
of the latter of the two effects was presented in the firm performance models, specifical-
ly in the positive sign of the interaction between outsidership and the highest ability 
quartile. Yet, for the remaining ability quartiles, the sign of this interaction was nega-
tive, a result theoretically predicted in hypothesis 3.  Embeddedness mediates the effect 
of individual ability by providing a network of ties within which entrepreneurs can act. 
The absence of such ties constrains the way economic actors navigate and map the ex-
isting opportunity landscape, thus imposing a de facto liability upon outsiders. 
 
B. Limitations and Paths for Future Research 
The implementation of a novel measure of individual ability shed some light on a num-
ber of entrepreneurial phenomena ranging from the performance of new ventures to the 
specialisation into serial entrepreneurship. Still, the present analysis may be comple-
mented in some aspects. The employed definition of entrepreneurial ability implied that 
all wage earners—and not only those who become entrepreneurs—were included in the 
estimation. An interesting property of the specification is that it permits the comparison 
of the abilities of those who eventually became entrepreneurs and those who remained 
in paid-employment. Previously conducted research observed that lower-paid wage 
workers, who have changed jobs more times than those with comparable attributes, are 
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more prone to enter self-employment (Evans and Leighton 1989), and that entrepre-
neurs may have a distaste for following orders, for which they suffer a cut in their in-
come (Hamilton 2000). A recent body of work examining the employee mobility to 
entrepreneurship ( stebro, Chen and Thompson, 2011) found that a disproportionate 
number of entrepreneurs had either very high or very low incomes compared to the gen-
eral population and proposed that entrepreneurs were drawn from the tails of the ability 
distribution. Findings by Carnahan et. al. (2012) regarding employee mobility to entre-
preneurship suggested that those with higher earnings are less likely to leave firms but 
when doing so, more prone to create new ventures. The transposal of the measure of 
ability developed here to the study of individual mobility to entrepreneurship can fur-
ther contribute to the profiling of entrepreneurs as employees and improve our 
knowledge of what determines the occupational choice and the outcomes of self-
employment. Furthermore, the clear link found between prior worker productivity and 
start-up performance may have implications to researchers working in the field of spin-
offs and entrepreneurial orientation of established firms. Estimates of people engaging 
in entrepreneurial behaviours range from 20% (Reynolds et al., 2005) to over 50% of 
the population (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986), making the question of how this orientation 
may be groomed inside organisations an especially relevant one. In this sense, the fol-
low-up of not only the departing employees, but also of the remaining parent companies 
could provide an interest path for future work. 
Finally, the present work did not purse the exploration of the fate of transferred 
firms. The comparison with continuing firm is of particular interest, namely with firms 
founded by entrepreneurs of equivalent ability, with findings possibly shedding some 
light on the consequences of the division of labour in entrepreneurship (Rosen, 1983). 
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C. Final Remarks 
In these final remarks I would like to momentarily return to the tales of Odysseus and 
the analogy used in the introductory chapter. In what was perhaps the most notable 
demonstration of his mētis, or cunning ability, Odysseus deceives the Cyclops Poly-
phemus by concealing his identity and claiming his name to be Οὖτις, or  ―Nobody‖. 
The hero then proceeds to blind and escape from Polyphemus whom in agony screams 
that ―Nobody‖ is hurting him. Upon hearing such plead, the other Cyclopes think Poly-
phemus is alone and being punished by the Gods, thus deciding to abandon him to his 
fate whilst involuntarily offering Odysseus a chance to escape the island.   
 The notions of identity and reputation, but also of ability and embeddedness 
were of central importance in the present thesis. As for the hero Odysseus, the ability to 
quickly identify opportunities constitutes a valuable asset for entrepreneurs. The notion 
of identity and of its persistent nature also plays a role in the analysis, with the differen-
tials in wages paid by employers being reflected in the later activities developed as en-
trepreneurs. Findings concerning the repeated starting of new ventures over time are 
also revealing of an identity of those who specialise into serial entrepreneurial.  
I will conclude with one last note also drawn from the episode of Odysseus and 
the Cyclops. Upon arriving at the island of Cyclopes, modern day Sicily, Odysseus and 
his men discovered and feasted upon the provisions of the absent Polyphemus. They 
acted that way not with ill intentions but rather because it was in accordance with their 
native customs of hospitality. Unsurprisingly, the Cyclops thought otherwise and started 
eating Odysseus‘ men as retribution. As it appeared, the lack of embeddedness was tak-
ing its toll on this otherwise seasoned explorers. The exception of course, was Odys-
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seus, whom by virtue of his superior ability managed to deceive Polyphemus and escape 
the island. In the end, outsidership may be a liability for most, but not for the fittest.  
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